Tuesday, December 6, 2016

570 Did Wall Street create the USSR and comm. China to avoid competitors?


In the books of Antony Sutton we can read how Wall Street has supported the creation of the USSR.

See: http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Sutton_Wall_Street_and_the_bolshevik_revolution-5.pdf  


Why did the bankers create the USSR ? 

Sutton: Because they did not wat to have in Russia another free-enterprise society. That would be competition. 
And maybe because they want people not to be free. 

I think it is very well documenteed that American bankers suppoted the Revolution. 
They were even interrogated by Congres about it. 

( See Sutton's book. Ch 11. U.S., Senate, Bolshevik Propaganda, hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, 65th Cong., pp. 679-80 )

Also Sutton wrote 3 books in which he described how much technology was sold by American firms to the Russians.  It seems that in reality they were not afraid at all from the Russians. (*) (*) (*)


So we see on the one hand that financial Elite who do what they like, and succeed to do that. 
And on the other hand the people of the USA who are scared for 70 years, and have to pay a very expensive army and finance all its wars.  

    ------------- 

But that is not all. 

It seems that the same trick was done in China ! 

Freda Utley was in China from 1945 to 1947. And she had a very clear impression that the American help of the government that was fighting Mao always was too little and always came too late. 
As if the USA wanted Mao to succeed and create communism in China ! 

Here is Utleys book which she wrote in 1947, warning her fellow Americans about the coming victory of the communists:  Copy of book.   or : HTML version

Recently I found a source which states that Mao has tried many times to start 'working relations', or even economic trade  with the USA, but the USA did not react to that. 
They preferred this huge country as an enemy, not as a partner. 
And the last thing they wanted is to help it on its way to industrialisation: 

 China presents exquisite ironies, not least the house in Shanghai where Mao and his comrades secretly founded the Communist Party of China in 1921. Today, it stands in the heart of a very capitalist shipping district; you walk out of this communist shrine with your Little Red Book and your plastic bust of Mao into the embrace of Starbucks,Apple, Cartier, Prada.
Would Mao be shocked? 
I doubt it.
Five years before his great revolution in 1949, he sent this secret message to Washington. “China must industrialise.” he wrote, “This can only be done by free enterprise. Chinese and American interests fit together, economically and politically. America need not fear that we will not be co-operative. We cannot risk any conflict.”
Mao offered to meet Franklin Roosevelt in the White House, and his successor Harry Truman, and his successor Dwight Eisenhower. He was rebuffed, or willfully ignored. The opportunity that might have changed contemporary history, prevented wars in Asia and saved countless lives was lost because the truth of these overtures was denied in1950s Washington “when the catatonic Cold War trance,” wrote the critic James Naremore, “held our country in its rigid grip”.

 ------------

After the dead of Mao the new leader Deng  Xiaoping did start industrialisation, and we see what the Chinese are able to do. (Example)
They have a higher IQ than Europeans and they can work very hard.
The Americans always knew that the Chinese would be fierce competitors, and chose to side-track them.
That is what I think.


569 Oliver Stone: Untold History of the United States.


Oliver Stone published in 2012 a very informative overview of US international policy in the last 100 years.

Stone shows us the world from a more neutral point of view.
Or maybe from a more pro-Russian point of view.

It is very very interesting.

It shows that banks and Big Corporations have always dominated the USA, except during the FDR years. But then they had little choice.

If you watch these video's you will defintely neeed to look at them again, because they contain so much information that one can impossibly remember and understand all of it in one time.

No problem: you will understand not only the last 100 years so much better than you did before. You will also understand so much better what is happening today in Ukraïne and in Syria.

Here are the sites on the internet where you can see the 12 episodes.

Amazon sells 3 DVD's for just 12 Euro's.
I just bought them and am very happy with them.


  De titels met een (?) er achter heb ik zelf gegeven.

Deel vooraf: A.  Rondom WO1. (?)
( minuut 1 tot 2:  Bush jr. zegt dat hij de wereld niet wil controleren…)

Deel vooraf: B.  De jaren 1920 tot 1940. (?)

Deel 1: Inleiding en WO2.



Deel 2:  Roosevelt, Truman, Wallace.

                                                                        of:  https://vimeo.com/136182101

deel 3:  De bom.

                                                                     of       https://vimeo.com/136256488


deel 4:  De Koude Oorlog 1945-1950.

Deel 5.  Jaren 50 (?)

Deel 6: Jaren 60 (?)

Deel 7: Vietnam ( ?)

deel 8: Reagan Gorbachov

Deel 9: Bush  and Clinton.

Deel 10: Bush and Obama: Age of Terror.




Sunday, December 4, 2016

568 Amerika steunt stiekem de vorming van een Verenigd Europa

In 1997 schreef een onderzoeker aan de Universiteit van Nottingham onderstaand artikel, 45 pag. lang.
Hij schrijft dat zijn resultaten overeen komen met een veel oudere studie ( 1962) die lang geklasseerd was: die van F.X. Rebatt. ( pag. 185)

Er waren meedere groepen in Europa die een V. E. wensten. Een federatie van de diverse landen. 
De oudste was Caldenhove Calergi, die er wat extreme ideeen op na hield. 
Maar ook Churchill was van de partij. 
Voor de VS reden genoeg om deze groepen in het geheim te steunen. 
Hun motief was:  angst voor Duitsland, en angst voor Rusland. 

Toch was dat VE ( Verenigd Europa) niet de hoofdzaak van de OSS en de CIA. 
( OSS = Office of Strategic Services = voorloper van de CIA.)

De vijf belangrijkste doelen waren: 
1. Politieke partijen steunen ( vooral om de communisten tegen te werken. 
2. De vakbonden inpalmen om communisten de wind uit de zeilen te nemen.
3 Europa cultureel en intellectueel te koloniseren of toch zeker te beïnvloeden.
4 In de Oostbloklanden  opstandigheid veroorzaken. ( Radio Free Europe)
5. Stay-behind ( GLADIO) units op zetten, omdat men dacht dat Rusland zou aanvallen.

Op pag 187 lezen we iets opmerkelijks: het begin van de CIA werkwijze volgens 'plausible deniability': 
After June 1948, however, such activities were theoretically superintended by
Frank Wisner's OPC, set up as a result of directive NSC 10/2, which
called for covert operations which 'if uncovered the United States
Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them'.

De amerikanen steunden het VE idee middels het ACEU: American Committee on United Europe. 
Hun steun was ook voor de gdrie bekende groepen: De European Movement, de Bilderberg Groep en Jean Monnet's actie comittee voor een United States of Europe. 

( Tot zover een samenvatting van de eerste 6 pagina's) 


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De link voor het originele document: 

( inleidende pagina. Niet belangrijk. )
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OSS, CIA and European unity: The American committee on United Europe,
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Het document:

OSS, CIA and European Unity: The American Committee on
United Europe, 1948-60


RICHARD J. ALDRICH

During the last ten years, diplomatic historians have attached
growing significance to intelligence, and the related subject of covert
operations, as increasingly important to an understanding of the early
Cold War.1 After 1945, a variety of Western organizations, not just
intelligence agencies, drew up programmes of covert operations
designed both to undermine Communist influence in Europe and to
ensure a welcome for the Marshall Plan. Examples have been
documented in the fields of electoral politics, organized labour and
cultural affairs. US officials trying to rebuild and stabilize postwar
Europe worked from the assumption that it required rapid
unification, perhaps leading to a United States of Europe. The
encouragement of European unification, one of the most consistent
components of Harry S. Truman's foreign policy, was even more
strongly emphasized under his successor General Dwight D.
Eisenhower. Moreover, under both Truman and Eisenhower, US
policymakers conceived of European unification not only as an
important end in itself, but also as a way to solve the German
problem.2 The use of covert operations for the specific promotion of
European unity has attracted little scholarly attention and remains
poorly understood.
One of the most interesting US covert operations in postwar
Europe was the funding of the European Movement. The European
Movement was an umbrella organization which led a prestigious, if
disparate, group of organizations urging rapid unification in Europe,
focusing their efforts upon the Council of Europe, and counting
Winston Churchill, Paul-Henri Spaak, Konrad Adenauer, Leon Blum
and Alcide de Gasperi as its five Presidents of Honour. In 1948, its

Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol.8, No.l (March 1997), pp. 184-227
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

OSS, CIA AND EUROPEAN UNITY  Page: 185
main handicap was the scarcity of funds. It will be argued here that
the discreet injection of over three million dollars between 1949 and
1960, mostly from US government sources, was central to efforts to
drum up mass support for the Schuman Plan, the European Defence
Community and a European Assembly with sovereign powers. This
covert contribution never formed less than half the European
Movement's budget and, after 1952, probably two-thirds. Simultaneously
they sought to undermine the staunch resistance of the British Labour
government to federalist ideas.3
This essay concentrates on the US dimension of these activities.4
The conduit for American assistance was the American Committee on
United Europe (ACUE), directed by senior figures from the American
intelligence community. This body was organized in the early Summer
of 1948 by Allen Welsh Dulles, then heading a committee reviewing
the organization of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on behalf of
the National Security Council (NSC), and also by William J. Donovan,
former head of the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS). They
were responding to separate requests for assistance from Count
Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, a veteran Pan-European campaigner
from Austria, and from Churchill. ACUE worked closely with US
government officials, particularly those in the Economic Cooperation
Administration (ECA) and also with the National Committee for a
Free Europe.
The propositions advanced in this essay draw primarily upon
collections of private papers deposited in Britain and the United
States, including the records of ACUE itself. However, they receive
crucial support from a doctoral thesis on the early European
Movement completed by EX. Rebattet at the University of Oxford in
1962, but only opened to public inspection in the early 1990s. F.X.
Rebattet was the son of the Secretary-General of the European
Movement, and his study was conducted with full access to the
internal papers of the European Movement and the cooperation of its
senior figures. While based on archives located in Belgium rather
than Britain and the United States, Rebattet's work confirms the
findings of this essay, and is remarkable for its frankness on the issue
of covert American funding.5
Although the work of ACUE prompts immediate and specific
questions about the role of US aid in stimulating popular federalism


 Page: 186  DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT
in postwar Europe, it is important not to lose sight of the broader
conclusions concerning the nature of American intervention in
Europe that can be drawn from this episode. The origins of this
programme lay less in the formal provisions of NSC directives, to
which intelligence historians have attached much importance, and
more in an informal and personal transatlantic network created by
members of the intelligence and resistance community during the
Second World War. Much US aid to non-Communist groups in
Europe was sent until 1950 through unofficial channels, though with
government approval and support.6
ACUE typifies the philosophy underpinning many such covert
operations. It made no attempt to manipulate organizations or
individuals. Instead, it sought genuinely independent vehicles that
seemed complementary to American policy, and tried to speed them
up. The history of ACUE shows us prominent European politicians in
search of discreet American assistance, rather than the CIA in search
of proxies. This, together with the common observation that many
Europeans in receipt of covert assistance belonged to the non-
Communist left, confirms Peter Coleman's adept characterization of
these activities in Europe as a 'Liberal Conspiracy'.7
Many Americans working for ACUE were either themselves
determined federalists with an interest in the United Nations or else
viewed American federalism as an ideal political model which could
be deployed elsewhere. ACUE believed that the United States had a
wealth of experience to offer in the field of cultural assimilation.
Accordingly, the history of ACUE can also be interpreted as part of
what the late Christopher Thome termed America as an 'idea nation',
exporting its values and political culture. It is also particularly
striking that the same small band of senior officials, many of them
from the Western intelligence community, were central in supporting
the three most important transnational elite groups emerging in the
1950s: the European Movement, the Bilderberg Group and Jean
Monnet's Action Committee for a United States of Europe. Finally, at
a time when some British antifederalists saw a continued 'special
relationship' with the United States as an alternative to (perhaps even
a refuge from) European federalism, it is ironic that some European
federalist initiatives should have been sustained with American
support.8

OSS, CIA AND EUROPEAN UNITY page 187

US Covert Operations in Europe
Any analysis of the ACUE must be set in the context of a broader
programme of US covert operations in Europe. Between 1948 and
1950 this expanded rapidly, partly in response to pressure from
senior State Department officials such as George Kennan, Head of
the Policy Planning Staff. On 6 January 1949, Kennan wrote to Frank
Wisner of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), the official
responsible, that the operations planned for 1949-50 met only the
minimum requirement. 'As the international situation develops, every
day makes more evident the importance of the role which will have
to be played by covert operations if our national interests are to be
adequately protected." Responsibility for the direction of US covert
operations before 1950 is difficult to locate and was problematic at
the time. Immediately after the war such activities were carried out
by a curious array of private bodies and also military organizations
that had absorbed some remnants of the wartime OSS. After June
1948, however, such activities were theoretically superintended by
Frank Wisner's OPC, set up as a result of directive NSC 10/2, which
called for covert operations which 'if uncovered the United States
Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them'.10
Although OPC came under the administrative umbrella of the CIA, it
took its orders from the State Department and the NSC, because
NSC 10/2 had laid down that although the State Department would
take no responsibility for OPC operations, nevertheless, State should
'maintain a firm guiding hand'.11 Here was a recipe for infighting and
confusion, as one OPC official remarked: 'Divided or part authority
never works. No person or agency can at the same time serve God
(NSC), Mammon (State) and an Administrative and Financial
Overlord (only), which the Director of CIA now is.' In 1950, the new
director of the CIA, Walter Bedell Smith, insisted that OPC be fully
integrated with the CIA, a process that turned out to be slow and
awkward.12
Coordination was further impeded by the small number of State
Department officials who were told about covert operations. Even
some divisional chiefs lacked a full picture of US activities within
their region of responsibility. At one point George Kennan and two
other members of the Policy Planning Staff, Maynard Barnes and


188 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT
John Davies were the only State Department officials permitted 'full
knowledge of OPC operations'. When Kennan wished to assign more
State Department personnel to the task of coordinating covert
operations, he was thwarted at first because he was not allowed to
tell the chiefs of the personnel divisions chiefs, who lacked adequate
security clearance, what he was doing.13
Despite this initial administrative confusion the broad objectives
of American operations in postwar Europe are now clear. They fall
into five categories. First, political parties, often of the non-
Communist left and centre, were subsidized. During the Italian
election of 1948, for example, various political groups were paid
millions of dollars, which helped to revitalize the hitherto listless
campaign of the future Prime Minister, de Gasperi.14 Second, in the
struggle for control of international labour organizations and for the
unions of Italy and France, American and European trade unionists
helped to undermine the Soviet-controlled World Federation of
Trade Unions. Staunchly anti-Communist members of the American
Federation of Labour (AFL), led by David Dubinsky, Jay Lovestone
and Irving Brown, were often more zealous than government agencies
thought wise."
Third, the United States attempted to influence cultural and
intellectual trends in Europe, funding a variety of groups,
conferences and publications. This reflected the presumption that
intellectuals were significant opinion formers in continental Europe.
This was undertaken in direct competition with Soviet funding,
developing into a 'battle of the festivals'. The best documented
examples are the Congress for Cultural Freedom and the magazine
Encounter, to which luminaries such as Raymond Aron, Stephen
Spender and Arthur Koestler contributed.
In an important change of policy, many cultural activities were
placed in the Spring of 1951 under a new department of the CIA, the
International Organizations Division.16 The use of private
organizations had been gathering pace since 1947, encouraged by
Allen Dulles, a keen enthusiast for covert operations, who had also
employed his position as Chairman of the Council of Foreign
Relations to seek the help of US foundations with projects such as a
proposed 'beachhead' university for European exiles at Strasbourg.
However, by late 1950, when Dulles exchanged his informal NSC


OSS, CIA AND EUROPEAN UNITY 189
consultancy role for a senior post within the CIA, he discovered that
operations with youth groups, trade unions and cultural organizations
lacked coherence and were fragmented, being dispersed untidily
across geographically organized sections. In the words of one CIA
official, this area was an 'operational junk heap'. The International
Organizations Division was proposed by Dulles's Special Assistant,
Thomas W. Braden, to superintend all such work. Though
controversial, with Bedell Smith's support the proposal was pushed
through and Braden headed this division until replaced by Cord
Meyer in 1954. The work done by Braden, Dulles and Bedell Smith
as Directors of ACUE went hand-in-hand with their administrative
reorganization of the CIA and the development of controversial new
programmes that would eventually have repercussions inside the
United States as well as in Europe.17
Braden's International Organizations Division was also involved
in the fourth type of US covert operation - provoking dissonance in
the satellite states. This effort was channelled through the National
Committee for a Free Europe, later known as the Free Europe
Committee, which controlled Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.
Much of the work, done with the help of irascible exile groups under
the Assembly of Captive European Nations (ACEN), was coordinated
by the CIA's burgeoning Munich station, which also gave aid to
resistance groups within eastern Europe. Lastly, OPC and then the
CIA, created stay-behind or GLADIO networks designed to offer
resistance, and trained displaced persons from eastern Europe as
special forces, against the possibility of a Soviet incursion into
western Europe. This programme was very active in the period
1948—49, when some in the US intelligence community believed that
war might be only six months away.18 Of these complementary
programmes, the attempt to promote European federalism remains
the least fully explored.


Churchill, Donovan and Dulles

The origins of covert aid to European federalists may be traced back
to Coudenhove-Kalergi. Like other prominent pan-Europeanists of
the interwar period, typically Aristide Briand the French Foreign
Minister, his ideas owed much to disillusionment caused by the First


190 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT
World War. Exiled to the United States in 1943, in March 1947, on
the eve of the Marshall Plan address, he was successfully lobbying US
Senators J.W Fulbright and E.D. Thomas for congressional support
for the idea of European unity and succeeded in having motions
passed in favour of a 'United States of Europe' in the Senate and in
the House of Representatives. Allen Dulles and William J. Donovan,
who had joined Coudenhove-Kalergi's campaign for American
support in 1947, now came together to create the short-lived
Committee for a Free and United Europe designed to publicize
European unity in the United States and to offer support to federalist
groups in Europe. This was formally founded on 19 April 1948 with
Senator Fulbright as its chairman and the William Bullitt, former
ambassador to France, as its vice-chairman. But this committee was
to enjoy little more than a paper existence."
Also in the summer of 1948 a rival group, the more prestigious
International Executive of the European Movement, closely
associated with Winston Churchill, arrived in New York to urge the
formation of an American committee to support their own efforts for
unification. This mission was led by the president of the European
Movement's international executive, Duncan Sandys, and included
its Secretary-General, Joseph H. Retinger and the head of the
European Movement's finance sub-committee, Major Edward
Berrington-Behrens.20 To avoid the embarrassment of two American
committees supporting rival groups, Count Coudenhove-Kalergi,
who had revealed himself as a rather prickly and awkward character,
was sidelined amid much bitter recrimination. A new body, the
American Committee on United Europe (ACUE) was formed to
support Churchill and the European Movement. Although Churchill
was now only leader of the opposition in Britain, he remained the
most prestigious of European statesmen.21
Moreover, Churchill was effectively the founder of the European
Movement. As early as 21 March 1943 he offered his vision of a
United Europe in a broadcast speech:
One can imagine that under a world institution embodying or
representing the United Nations, and some day all nations,
there should come into being a Council of Europe and a
Council of Asia ... We must try to make the Council of Europe
OSS, CIA AND EUROPEAN UNITY 191


... into a really effective League with all the strongest forces
concerned woven into its texture, with a High Court to adjust
disputes and with forces, armed forces, national or international
or both, held ready to impose these decisions and prevent
renewed aggression and the preparation of future wars.22
By November 1945, Churchill was speaking of a 'United States of
Europe'.23 Although personally more enthusiastic about Franco-
German reconciliation than European unity, nevertheless he had been
the central figure at a major congress of federalist groups held at the
Hague in May 1948 which called for a European parliament with
effective powers over political union. Free of governmental
responsibilities, Churchill had more time for such work and there
was no doubt that his group was the more promising candidate for
US support.
The European Movement tried, somewhat uncertainly, to focus and
coordinate the efforts of prounity groups throughout Europe. Though
numerous, their approaches were so diverse that it remains difficult to
gauge the extent of their popular support. It was probably strongest in
France where, by 1949, the Quai d'Orsay, which initially had no
interest in European unity, was forced to pay more it attention 'partly
as a response to growing public demand'. The French Prime Minister,
George Bidault, and senior French officials decided that the idea of a
European Assembly was 'growing in popularity' partly because
federalism seemed to offer a solution to the German problem. By
contrast, federalism enjoyed little popular support in Britain. Although
the ideas of interwar 'British Federal Union', supported by prominent
figures such as Lord Lothian, influenced an entire generation of
Europeans, its membership was small. Meanwhile the new Labour
government remained wary of federalist initiatives.
The European Movement focused its hopes upon the European
Assembly at Strasbourg, which grew out of the Brussels Treaty of 17
March 1948. In late October 1948 the Brussels Treaty powers
decided to establish a Council of Europe, consisting of a Council of
Ministers and an advisory European Assembly which, in practice,
served as an irregular conference of national delegations. This
decision was confirmed at a meeting of foreign ministers in London
where the Statute of the Council of Europe was signed as the Treaty


192 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT
of Westminster on 5 May 1949. In August 1949 the Assembly of the
Council of Europe held its first session at Strasbourg.24
The ACUE and its short-lived predecessor were only two of many
'American' and 'Free' committees established during 1948 and 1949.
Well-documented examples include the National Committee for a
Free Europe (later the Free Europe Committee) and the Free Asia
Committee (later the Asia Foundation). The Free Europe Committee,
formed in 1948 by the retired diplomat Joseph E. Grew at Kennan's
request, worked closely with the CIA to maintain contact between
exile groups in the West and the Eastern bloc. Their campaign 'to
keep alive the hope of liberation in Eastern Europe', was launched
publicly in 1949 by the recently retired American military governor
in Germany, General Lucius D. Clay.25 The initial membership
included many senior government figures such as the former
Assistant Secretary of State, Adolphe Berle, Allen Dulles and ex-OSS
personnel such as Frederic R. Dolbeare. The Free Europe Committee
purported to draw its resources from private subscriptions and
various foundations, but in reality the majority of its funds came from
the US government through channels managed by the CIA.26 Parallel
committees were simultaneously formed to address Cold War or
reconstruction themes. Donovan had already joined with Berle to
found the Committee for Social and Economic Development in Italy,
to combine aid to the poorer south with a pro-American stance and
support for the government. Meanwhile, Dulles had founded the
American Committee on Germany. Both he and Donovan were
worried by the accelerating European Cold War and as early as 1947
Donovan toured Europe to examine Communist penetration of
labour movements, while Allen Dulles wrote a detailed study in
support of the Marshall Plan.27
Senior figures from the US intelligence community provided the
leadership of ACUE during its first three years. The chairman was
Donovan who, despite the demise of OSS, was not in retirement, and
continued to work for the CIA as late as 1955.28 The vice-chairman
was Allen Dulles and day-to-day ACUE administration was controlled
by Thomas W Braden, the executive director, who had also served in
OSS. Braden formally joined the CIA as special assistant to Allen
Dulles in late 1950. Donovan and Allen Dulles were well known for
their work in espionage, which was likely to prompt awkward


OSS, CIA AND EUROPEAN UNITY 193
questions about the nature of ACUE. Accordingly, in turn, during the
early 1950s, Dulles, Braden and finally Donovan were succeeded by
less well known figures.2'
The structure of the ACUE resembled that of the Free Europe
Committee, with which it shared members. Officially incorporated in
February 1949, the ACUE Board of Directors was drawn from four
main groups: senior figures from government, such as Clay, Bedell
Smith, the Secretary of State for War Robert T. Paterson, and the
Director of the Budget James E. Webb; ECA personnel and other
officials responsible for formulating US policy in Europe, including the
ECA administrator Paul Hoffman, deputy ECA administrators Howard
Bruce and William C. Foster, and the US representative on the North
Atlantic Council Charles M. Spofford; prominent politicians,
financiers and lawyers including Herbert H. Lehman, Charles R. Hook
and Conrad N. Hilton; and AFL-CIO figures already involved in the
politics of labour movements, notably Arthur Goldberg, now chief
counsel for the CIO, who had run the OSS Labour Desk, and the
prominent unionists, David Dubinsky and Jay Lovestone.30
The ACUE's primary function was to fund unofficial groups
working for unity, many of which originated in, or drew their
members from, wartime resistance groups with whom Donovan and
Dulles had worked previously. Its directors emphasized the recent
achievements of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation
(OEEC), they saw this and future political unity as
providing 'the sinews of real strength' for a NATO organization. By
1950 they claimed (with some hyperbole) that recent proposals for a
European Defence Community were 'at the heart of NATO military
arrangements'.31 The assumption which underpinned much ACUE
thinking was that unification would resolve the old problems of
European nationalism, reconciling the French and others to the
harnessing of German military power. Donovan, in particular,
favoured the Schuman Plan, a scheme to integrate heavy industry in
France and Germany, for these reasons.32 Strict criteria were set out
for the receipt of subsidies: programmes had to be 'concrete' and the
groups supported had to believe in a rapid rather than a gradual
approach to western European integration; including support for: (a)
the strengthening of the Council of Europe by gaining greater
political authority, (b) the early realization of the basic aims of the


194 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT
Marshall Plan, the Mutual Security Act and the North Atlantic
Security Organization. Programmes receiving support also had to
favour the inclusion of Western Germany within a unified Europe
and have the potential to influence a substantial segment of opinion
in Europe. Lastly, their work 'must not be in opposition to the
foreign policy of the United States'. The ACUE's secondary
objectives, entirely overt, included publicizing European unity within
the United States, lobbying Congress on European issues and
sponsoring scholarly research on federalism. This open work allowed
ACUE to maintain a public existence with offices in New York.33
Despite the existence of this well-organized US apparatus, it was
competing groups of Europeans actively seeking discreet American
support, who set its agenda. The European Movement had told the
ACUE in no uncertain terms that it wanted 'moral support and
money'. In March 1949 Churchill visited New York to discuss final
details with Donovan and Dulles and also to attend the formal launch
of ACUE which took the form of a public lunch in his honour. He
followed this up by writing to ask him on 4 June what short-term
funds ACUE could provide.34 In practice, control of the money soon
passed to Duncan Sandys, Churchill's son-in-law and president of the
international executive of the European Movement. On 24 June,
Sandys wrote to Donovan confidentially setting out its requirements.
The European Movement, nearly bankrupt, needed £80,000 to
survive the next six months.
Cord Meyer, who joined Braden's International Organizations
Division in 1951, recalls that the
European political and cultural leaders who solicited our aid ...
made it a condition that their be no publicity, since the
Communist propaganda machine could exploit any overt
evidence of official American support as proof that they were
puppets of the American imperialists.
Therefore, while Sandys pleaded for 'a really large contribution from
America', at the same time he was 'very anxious that American
financial support for the European Movement should not be known',
even to the International Council of the Movement, to avoid charges
of 'American intervention'.35 Sandys and the ACUE feared Soviet
charges of US capitalist imperialism.


OSS, CIA AND EUROPEAN UNITY 195
Churchill, at once the most prominent advocate of European
unity and the best known transatlantic evangelist, was the vital link
between ACUE and the European Movement. He enjoyed unrivalled
personal contacts with American and European leaders; his
fascination with intelligence and subversion kept him in touch with
practitioners on both sides of the Atlantic; and he shared the view of
Allen Dulles and Donovan that the promotion of European unity
through ACUE was the 'unofficial counterpart' to the Marshall
Plan.36 In 1949, Churchill also subscribed to the wider objectives of
the various freedom committees in eastern Europe. ACUE and the
European Movement should join hands with the Free Europe
Committee because European unity implied nothing less than the
liberation of eastern Europe. In his speech at the formal launch of
ACUE in New York on 29 March 1949, Churchill stated:
There can be no permanent peace while ten capitals of Eastern
Europe are in the hands of the Soviet Communist Government.
We have our relations with these nations behind the iron
curtain. They send their delegates to our meetings and we know
their feelings and how gladly they would be incorporated in the
new United Europe ... We therefore take in our aim and ideal,
nothing less than the union of Europe as a whole.37
The delegates to whom Churchill referred were primarily from the
Assembly of Captive European Nations (ACEN), seen in 1949 as
expressing a link between European unity and liberation, however
distant.38 During conversation in 1949 with William Hayter, the
chairman of the UK Joint Intelligence Committee in London, Kennan
stated that although neither eastern Europe, nor indeed Britain,
might join a federal Europe in the short term, nevertheless, in the
long term Europe could only move towards federalism, or unification
'Phase Two', once an over-extended Soviet Union had withdrawn to
her own borders.39
Stabilizing the European Movement
Paradoxically, while the scale of ACUE support for activities in
Europe only reached its zenith after 1952, it had its greatest influence
three years earlier. In 1949 and 1950, it saved the European


196 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT
Movement from financial collapse during the first meetings of the
Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe at Strasbourg.
Despite the substantial financial aid given by the ACUE in 1949,
Braden returned from Europe in early 1950 to report that, once
again, 'the Movement is very low on funds'. The ACUE had
supported conferences held at Brussels in February 1949 and at
Westminster in April 1949 which had laid the foundations for the
Council of Europe, and was paying part of the costs of the European
Movement's secretariat and administration. This strained the ACUE's
resources at a time when it was relying partly on private donations.40
In 1950 ACUE also helped to resolve awkward leadership
problems in Europe. In the early summer, following talks with leaders
of the European Movement, including Spaak and the Belgian Foreign
Minister Paul van Zeeland, Braden and Donovan concluded, rather
prematurely, that Europe was on the brink of federation. They
believed that if those who were taking the lead received substantial
support immediately, enormous progress would be made during the
next year. At the same time, they perceived a seemingly immovable
obstacle, the growing resistance of the British to a federal Europe.
The British Labour government, while not anti-Europe, preferred
intergovernmental cooperation by independent states and fiercely
resisted any diminution of sovereignty. The British Foreign Secretary,
Ernest Bevin, had played a key role in emasculating the Council of
Europe at Strasbourg.41
British resistance increased in late 1949 and early 1950 as the
president of the European Movement itself, Duncan Sandys, working
closely with Churchill, sensed that the European Movement was
moving much faster than they, the British Conservative Party, wished.
Although Sandys had previously made speeches with strong federalist
overtones, calling for 'a United States of Europe' at Brussels as early
as November 1945, neither had clearly thought out the implications
for British foreign policy. The Sandys leadership was now
uncomfortable and dragged its feet. The resulting dissonance had
material effects upon the fortunes of the European Movement, for it
was these increasingly open disputes that had dissuaded the Swiss
from providing further funding as early as 1948. By early 1950 the
European Movement, always a somewhat fragmented body, was close
to disintegration, with the influential French-based European Union


OSS, CIA AND EUROPEAN UNITY 197
of Federalists withdrawing from the international executive of the
European Movement in protest.42
In June 1950, the ACUE had abruptly refused to continue funding
the discordant European Movement, sending Donovan and Braden
back to Europe on a mission to find out what was going on.43 Braden
confirmed that the European Movement was torn between its British
and continental leadership: increasingly anti-federalist statements by
the British government had forced the hand of Spaak and the
continental federalists. Spaak confided that he had been reluctant to
pursue rapid continental federalism in the absence of British support
on account of the close relationship between London and
Washington. If the US would back him, however, he would press
ahead without Britain, knowing that 'Britain will be forced sooner or
later and in a greater or lesser degree to come along'. Braden warned
the directors of ACUE unless they backed the continental federalists
then inevitably 'leadership on the continent will go to British Labour'
with dire consequences for unification. Once promised more ACUE
support by Braden in June, Spaak was willing to take over the
leadership of the European Movement.44
In the event Sandys offered little resistance. During late 1949 and
early 1950 Sandys had struggled with increasing difficulty to find a
compromise formula that would embrace both the reticence of the
British and Scandinavian elements and the federalist position taken by
the likes of Henry Frenay, chairman of the European Union of
Federalists. Matters had reached a clear impasse as early as 16 December
1949 at an ad hoc meeting of the leadership of the European
Movement when two compromise declarations had been discussed at
length but eventually rejected. The Secretary-General of the European
Movement, Joseph Retinger had been suggesting that Sandys resign
since March 1950, but in the months that followed increasing pressure
made this development inevitable. In a letter to Sandys, Retinger put
the case for his departure frankly: 'The various Movements composing
the European Movement are looking with increasing suspicion on your
activities; our American friends do not agree with your tactics.' In July
1950, shortly after the Braden-Donovan mission, Sandys departed and
Spaak's federalist element now took control.45 Although not overtly
addressed in the correspondence relating to the departure of Sandys,
financial matters had clearly constituted an additional area of


198 DIPLOMACY 5c STATECRAFT
confrontation amongst leading members of the European Movement.
Rebattet's remarkable study suggests that the whole financial structure
under Sandys was 'very unorthodox'. Throughout 1949, strong attacks
were made against Sandys on the nature of some of the expenses
incurred and 'a certain squandering of funds'. In 1950, 'a very bad
financial situation' was bequeathed to Spaak and arguments developed
as to the distribution of new tranches of funding that were beginning
to arrive from the United States.46 The ACUE now played a significant
role. Under Spaak, with the support of the European Union of
Federalists and finance from ACUE, the international secretariat of the
European Movement was transferred from London and Paris to
Brussels.47
The reorganization of the European Movement fitted in with the
State Department's unsuccessful bid of October 1949 to install Spaak
as director-general at the helm of the OEEC. In John Gillingham's
words, the 'American choice for "Mr Europe" was ... Paul-Henri
Spaak', but British 'foot-dragging' and hostility prevented his
appointment.48 Spaak's leadership was expected to transform the
nature of the European Movement. An 'efficient and adequately
staffed secretariat' was set up in Brussels, with experienced national
representatives, including George Rebattet, former secretary of the
French Maquis and Leon Radfoux, Spaak's former Chef de Cabinet.
The primary objective of this new secretariat was to generate a
popular groundswell of support for federalism through the 'initiation
of major propaganda campaigns in all countries' including a united
Europe week, punctuated by speeches from Bidault, Spaak and van
Zeeland. Braden reported that the goals were a free trade area with
a single currency and free movement of labour, and agreement that
recommendations adopted by the consultative assembly of the
Council of Europe at Strasbourg should have to be debated in
national parliaments.49
ACUE and American Foreign Policy
How closely did the ACUE follow mainstream American policy during
the period 1949-51? Two problems immediately arise: first, while
ACUE records are open to public inspection, the minutes of the
committees that coordinated the overt and covert aspects of American


OSS, CIA AND EUROPEAN UNITY 199
policy remain closed.50 Second, although the US administration agreed
that a federal Europe was its goal, it was divided over how much
pressure to apply. Some parts of the Truman administration were closer
to the ACUE than others.
The ACUE followed American policy most closely in its attempts
to tie European unity to the cause of east European exile groups and
with political warfare designed to create unrest within the satellite
states. In May 1950, during the London Tripartite Foreign Ministers
Conference, the United States persuaded Britain and France to give
the exile groups associate membership of the Council of Europe. A
year later the White House endorsed State Department plans to
accelerate these efforts. Outlining their proposals in a special
guidance paper entitled 'The Concept of Europe', they admitted their
concern that the main propaganda effort in the East lacked the
'positive qualities which are necessary to arouse nations'. Several
studies had been made in an attempt to find a positive concept and
the themes of 'European Unity' and 'Return to Europe' might rectify
this problem. Its 'solely European' nature ensured that it could not be
'dismissed as another manoeuvre of "American imperialism"'. Nor
could the Soviets appropriate the European idea in the same manner
as themes such as 'freedom', 'democracy' and 'peace'. As the Council
of Europe had recently adopted a Charter of Human Rights, this
offered a particularly choice instrument with which to highlight the
more unpleasant aspects of Soviet rule. All this, the State Department
hoped, would encourage Eastern bloc populations to stiffen their
resistance to Communist domination - 'retard the Sovietization of
their minds, especially the minds of their youth' - to which the White
House agreed. George M. Elsey, a member of Truman's staff, noted
that this was 'going in the right direction ... a good contribution
toward the goal we were discussing at noon, namely, a subverting of
Iron Curtain countries'.51
European unity was more divisive, however, when applied to west
Europe. While unification was officially a central component of US
policy - Congress had stipulated it as a condition of further Marshall
Plan aid - senior State Department officials showed, as early as policy
planning staff (PPS) meetings in July 1949, a wish to avoid alienating
an anti-federalist Britain and the Commonwealth with whom the
United States sought to collaborate in other areas of the world.


200 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT
Kennan was himself sceptical of the value of immediate British
participation in a federal Europe, and was anxious to reassure British
officials, speaking instead of a long period characterized by some
kind of loose 'Atlantic Community'. Kennan added that British
objections to any merger of sovereignty with western Europe 'were
of such strength that they must be accepted', and that Washington
ought not to push her further than she wished to go.
Looking to the long term, however, Kennan was firmly in favour
of a federal Europe that would absorb Britain, drawing his inspiration
for a future Europe from the American federal model. It 'was clear
that eventual union was in his mind' noted one wary British official.
Kennan pointed to the painful economic adjustments which Britain
would have to make, comparable to those which New England
underwent during the expansion of the United States and the
probable need for transfers of population. Notwithstanding these
long-term federalist speculations, Kennan returned from Europe with
a fuller appreciation of the complex problems of the Commonwealth,
of sterling and the reluctance of Britain to submerge her identity in a
federal Europe.52
ECA officials and indeed Spaak himself constantly urged
Washington to apply greater pressure upon Bevin to change his mind
about an integrated western Europe. On 19 January 1950, Spaak
complained bitterly to Kennan and the Secretary of State, Dean
Acheson, of what he saw as Britain's attempts to obstruct both OEEC
and the Council of Europe. When Kennan, Paul Nitze of the PPS and
Charles Bohlen from the Paris embassy attended a PPS meeting on
western Europe a few days later, Nitze summed up the dilemma:
although Britain's Commonwealth ties and her fears over sovereignty
inclined her against federalism, would a continental federation be
strong enough without Britain? The PPS agreed that Bevin had been
'back-sliding' over commitments to OEEC and that this now required
action, but there was no agreement on the merger of sovereignty or
on Germany. Bohlen, representing American officials based in Paris,
including ECA, complained that the United States was reluctant to
apply real pressure in London, as they habitually did in Paris, because
of the close wartime relationship: the Empire-Commonwealth should
be broken up, he argued, allowing Britain to merge with a federal
Europe. Kennan replied that the Commonwealth was valuable; in


OSS, CIA AND EUROPEAN UNITY 201
any case, he could not envisage Britain and Germany working
together in the short term. The United States should do no more than
try gently to persuade Britain to move towards Europe."
Thus, in the autumn of 1950, when Donovan, too, attempted to
persuade Acheson to push Britain into joining the Schuman Plan,
Acheson only agreed to 'appropriately urge' Britain down the
federalist road: 'the British themselves must be the judge of whether
a step as far as genuine federation with Western Europe would be
consistent with their Commonwealth commitments and in the best
interests of their people'. Acheson viewed overt pressure for
federalism as counterproductive, a view that not only reflected PPS
discussions during 1949 and 1950, but also prefigured the problems
encountered in 1953 when the United States lobbied hard for the
proposed European Defence Community.54
Acheson's approach dismayed US officials in Europe who had the
task of carrying out the agreements on European economic
cooperation. The ambassador in Paris, David K. Bruce; the special
ECA representative, Averell Harriman; the ECA's counsel, Samuel
Katz; and the ambassador in London, Lewis Douglas, all agreed that
Britain was their 'big problem'. Harriman was the most vociferous,
and meeting with Bruce and John J. McCloy, the US High
Commissioner in Germany in January 1950, he explained that he had
enough of Bevin and of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir
Stafford Cripps, whom he found 'petulant and arrogant'. 'Harriman
was extremely perturbed.' He explained that hitherto he 'had been
firm believer in U.S. attitude of persuasion against coercion'. But now
he 'felt the US should no longer tolerate interference and sabotage of
Western European integration by the United Kingdom ... the
Marshall Plan is breaking down because of British opposition'. He
added a warning that if British Labour won the forthcoming election
of 1950, as seemed likely, they would 'be even more cocky'. 'The U.S
would not stand for this much longer.' At a meeting in March 1950,
senior American officials in Europe called for a study of the degree
and timing of pressure to be brought to bear on Britain. Nevertheless,
Douglas, despite his sceptical view of Labour's programme of social
expenditure, warned against acting during the forthcoming British
election, noting that Labour might derive advantage from posing as a
defender of the Commonwealth against American pressure.55


202 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT
Accordingly, ACUE appears not to have challenged the State
Department policy of avoiding open pressure on Britain or indeed on
other countries in support of federalism. Nevertheless, Donovan and
Braden shared the enthusiasm of the ECA for the ideas of Spaak and
rapid federalism, and they decided to work with it more closely. A
good example is their 'crisis mission' to Europe in June 1950.
Frustrated by Acheson, Donovan met the leadership of ECA in Paris,
including Harriman and Katz. Personal connections were important
here, as Katz had previously served as a senior officer in the Secret
Intelligence branch of OSS, overseeing operations in wartime
Europe. Meanwhile David Bruce, the OSS chief of station in wartime
London, had been head of ECA in Paris before becoming
ambassador." Nor were these the only ex-OSS officials involved in
the promotion of a federalist solution in postwar Europe. They were
following in the footsteps of Charles P. Kindleberger and Walt W.
Rostow, two OSS economists who, in 1946, had persuaded James
Byrnes and Jean Monnet to launch the ill-fated idea of a UN-backed
Economic Commission for Europe.57 The ECA, delighted to learn of
Spaak's forthcoming leadership of the European Movement, offered
its own discreet assistance to the European Movement, which had
been 'previously withheld because of concern over the leadership'.58
The Braden-Donovan mission of June 1950 also helped to
confirm the ACUE's view of Britain's Labour Party as the biggest
barrier to rapid European federalism in Europe.59 This analysis was
confirmed by the remarkable attack the British delegation launched
upon the French federalists at Strasbourg in the summer of 1950.60
ACUE were not mere passive observers of British antifederalism and
sought to support federalist dissenters within the British Labour
Party, such as the Member of Parliament for Hull North-West, R.W.
Mackay, who devised a compromise route to federalism, which
became known as the 'Mackay Plan'. These activities were resented
by the Labour leadership.61 From January 1950, much of Mackay's
activity was dependent on ACUE funding. However, in 1951, the
British and Scandinavians vetoed the presentation of the Mackay Plan
to the full Assembly.62
After a year of ACUE activities, the British Foreign Office seem to
have been aware only of its overt publicity campaign in the USA,
which had caused some irritation in London. In early February 1950,


OSS, CIA AND EUROPEAN UNITY 203
Joseph Retinger, Secretary-General of the European Movement,
wrote to Sir Stafford Cripps, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer,
asking if Attlee and Bevin would state publicly their support for
European unification. Donovan desired these statements from all
European leaders, intending to publish them together as part of efforts
to persuade Congress to continue Marshall Plan aid. The Foreign
Office concluded that, as most of the statesmen of western Europe had
complied, Bevin would have to say something. But Bevin's message of
support was so equivocal that ACUE asked the Foreign Office whether
there had been some mistake, only to be told that Bevin had
personally insisted upon the insertion of the more offensive
sentences." ACUE were further disappointed when Churchill and
Eden, returning to power in 1951, increasingly set their face against
federalist ideas. Accordingly, by November 1951, both Spaak in
Europe and ACUE in the United States, increasingly despaired of the
elite route to federalism and turned to mass agitation.64
ACUE in the United States
It is possible to detect this increasing emphasis upon publicity and
propaganda as early as 1950, particularly in the overt work that
ACUE conducted within the United States from its offices at 537
Fifth Avenue, New York. ACUE tried to persuade elite opinion to
support European federalism. To this end it organized and paid for a
stream of visits and lecture tours by prominent European figures,
including Churchill, Spaak and Paul van Zeeland. Robert Schuman,
Paul Reynaud, Konrad Adenauer and Guy Mollet followed in their
wake.65 Spaak's visit during January and February 1951 attracted a
great deal of press and radio attention and during his six-week tour
he addressed audiences in 13 cities including New York, Palm Beach,
Chicago, San Francisco and Los Angeles. There was rarely a moment
when ACUE did not have a major speaker in circulation around the
United States and increasingly it was to ACUE that student groups,
colleges, radio and television in the United States turned to for
speakers on European issues.66 Steps were also taken to ensure that
the AFL-CIO actively supported European unification, particularly
the Schuman Plan, and US observers were continually despatched to
the Council of Europe.67


204 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT
Congress received considerable attention during the crucial first
hearings on the new Marshall Plan appropriations of February and
March 1950. Donovan testified before the House of Representatives'
Foreign Affairs Committee on the Marshall Plan in his capacity as
chairman of the ACUE and Congress were continually bombarded
with federalist literature. More importantly, Donovan in New York
and Spaak in Brussels held simultaneous press conferences in which
they released the text of prounity statements carefully gathered by
Retinger from 50 prominent European statesmen, effectively dispelling
lingering doubts about European commitment to progress and
creating a very favourable atmosphere for the renewal of Marshall
Aid by the legislature. In June of the same year the French embassy
in Washington thanked Donovan for organizing an open message to
Prime Minister Schuman in favour of the Schuman Plan signed by
'118 American big names', including former secretaries of state
Marshall and Stimson, and released at a press conference in New
York by Allen Dulles. By 1951 the ACUE had produced 17 publications
and was publishing a regular fortnightly newsletter for circulation in
the USA. It also distributed material produced in Europe, including
the international bulletin of the European Movement, Europe Today
and Tommorowf'* Thereafter, in response to critics of assistance to
Europe, the ACUE shifted their American focus away from elites
towards a wider audience, arranging for radio broadcasts by
Donovan and for his articles to be published in Atlantic Monthly and
the San Francisco Chronicle. In April 1952, ACUE took out a fullpage
advert in the New York Times entitled 'The Survival of Europe'
advocating European union.69
ACUE also commissioned American academics to undertake
research projects into the problems of federalism. As early as 1950,
Braden was trying to organize a major study of the most effective
routes to unity, co-funded by ACUE and the Economic League for
European Co-operation, to be undertaken by a team led by Richard
Bissell Jr. of the ECA. Perhaps the most interesting ACUE project was
launched at Harvard University in 1952.70 This project was managed
by the leading European historian and propaganda expert, Carl
Friedrich, who was himself deeply committed the federalist cause.
For Friedrich, European unity was not only valuable in itself, but was
a stepping-stone to world federalism, ideas that he developed in work


OSS, CIA AND EUROPEAN UNITY 205
published during the 1950s and 1960s.71 In 1952, the ACUE
commissioned Friedrich to undertake a major comparative study of
the constitutional problems of federalism in Australia, Canada,
Germany, Switzerland and the United States. The study, including
seven volumes of accompanying documents, was widely disseminated
and, by 1953, despite acrimony about the spiralling costs, continued
work on this project was accompanied by work on a French edition.
By 1956 an Italian edition was also in preparation.72
Friedrich's work is also noteworthy because it illustrates the
complex links between ACUE and the Free Europe Committee.
Throughout the 1950s, Friedrich also worked for the Free Europe
Committee as a consultant on the Soviet zone of Germany. In 1951,
he urged a forward policy upon Allen Dulles and upon the President
of Radio Free Europe, CD. Jackson, describing Berlin as a base from
which the United States could support and expand a resistance
network which he claimed was already 'effectively harassing the
Soviet authorities and their German Communist stooges'.73 Although
Dulles and Jackson agreed, other US officials in Germany harboured
growing doubts about the value of this sort of work.74
American academics played an important part in expanding the
activities of ACUE. In 1950 a cultural section of ACUE was launched,
directed by two American historians who had served in OSS, the
president of Bennington College Frederick H. Burkhardt and William
L. Langer of Harvard University. The grants they distributed helped
to establish the European Cultural Centre in Geneva and assisted the
Inter-University Union of Federalists.75 ACUE also took an interest in
the College of Europe at Bruges, designed to provide a training for
future European officials. One of the attractions of the college was its
leadership who had played an active part in the wartime resistance.
One of its principals, Dr H. Brugman, was an important influence
upon the federalist ideas circulating within the European resistance
movements, as expressed in clandestine newspapers such as the
Dutch Het Parool and the French Combat and Resistance.76 In June
1951, ACUE offered scholarships for American students to attend the
college.77 American cultural leaders and academics, they asserted,
could offer a federalizing Europe the benefit of 'our experience -
good and bad - in the fields of mass communication and intercultural
assimilation'.78


206 DIPLOMACY &c STATECRAFT
The Search for Popular Federalism
The ACUE's work in continental Europe during the early 1950s also
focused increasingly upon propaganda and mass action. During the
upheaval while the European Movement was being reorganized in
1950, they turned to the European Movement's member organizations
to promote federalism; in practice this meant the French-dominated
European Union of Federalists, which Donovan considered to be the
more effective group. The French proposed to stir Strasbourg into
action by launching a grassroots populist movement, the European
Council of Vigilance, under the wartime French resistance leader
Henri Frenay, which would meet in a building adjacent to the
Council of Europe, and shower it with local petitions supporting
federalism. ACUE gave the Council of Vigilance an initial grant of
$42,000.7'
By the spring of 1951, with Spaak's new leadership, the European
Movement as a whole was again an effective organization. ACUE,
Spaak and Frenay threw themselves into the attempt to generate mass
support for federalism. In the short term they hoped to create support
for the Schuman Plan, for more authority for the Council of Europe
and for the idea of a European army, later the EDC. After 'extensive
talks' between Donovan and Eisenhower in the spring of 1951, ACUE
placed increasing emphasis upon integrating Germany into western
Europe, to quieten fears over rearmament and US worries about a
German drift towards neutrality. Although Donovan knew that a
federal Europe was not 'immediately imminent', he concluded that 'a
pattern of specialized authorities will create the unified military force
and free economic trade area in Europe that are necessary if Europe is
to obtain maximum strength and assure the success of General
Eisenhower's mission'. As examples, Donovan pointed to proposals
for a European Transport Authority and a European Agricultural
Organization, modelled on the Schuman Plan.80
The joint conviction of Spaak and Donovan that European unity
could best be driven forward by a mass propaganda campaign
coincided neatly with deep American concerns about the success of
Eastern bloc propaganda efforts in the area of youth movements and
international organizations generally. In the summer of 1951, a
growing crescendo of organized Communist youth activity was


OSS, CIA AND EUROPEAN UNITY 207
highlighted by a gigantic youth rally organized by the 'Freie Deutche
Jugend' and attended by about 2,000,000 youth representatives from
all over the world. This single rally was estimated to have cost the
Soviets over £20,000,000. British intelligence obtained film of the
rally and its scale alarmed senior Western policymakers, including
John J. McCloy, the American High Commissioner for Germany.
McCloy, already heavily involved in American psychological and
covert warfare, immediately recognized the importance of this
development and decided that counteraction was imperative.
Shepard Stone, a member of his staff, contacted Joseph Retinger, the
Secretary-General of the European Movement and asked if they
would be willing to organize a similar demonstration in western
Europe. Considerable additional funds would be provided by the
American government and funnelled through the ACUE, provided
they were used specifically for youth work. Retinger accepted and,
together with Spaak and Andre Phillip, he formed a three-man special
committee to map out the profile of the European youth campaign.81
Accordingly, in 1951, the majority of ACUE funds for Europe were
employed on a new venture - a unity campaign amongst European
youth. Between 1951 and 1956 the European Movement organized
over 2,000 rallies and festivals on the continent, particularly in
Germany where they received the help of the US army. One of the
additional advantages of deploying American funds on the large youth
programmes was that it helped to disguise the extent to which the
European Movement was dependent upon American funds. In May
1952 Spaak decided that funds from American sources that had
previously been used in the ordinary budget of the European
Movement would now be diverted for use in the 'Special Budgets' used
to support their growing range of new programmes. This disguised
their source and avoided any accusations of American dependency.
Again, in November 1953, Baron Boel, the treasurer of the European
Movement, explained that it was essential to avoid a situation where
opponents of European unity could accuse them of being an American
creation. For this reason 'American money, quite acceptable for the
European Youth Campaign and certain restricted activities, could not
be used for the normal running of the Movement'. Through the use of
'Special Budgets', the large sums from American sources did not show
up in the ordinary budget of the European Movement.82


208 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT
By the end of 1951, an International Youth Secretariat had been
established in Paris, with smaller offices throughout western Europe
and a campaign youth newspaper in five languages. In 1952,
representatives were elected to a European Parliament of Youth who
were to help the European Movement 'to inform the masses of
European youth of their obligations to themselves and the free
world'. By the end of 1953, the campaign was costing ACUE
$200,000 a year." Although it is difficult to identify the extent to
which these activities had an impact on mass opinion, senior
Europeans, eager for more funds, attributed their successes to the
mass campaign. Monnet's letter to Donovan in October 1952 was
typical, asserting: 'Your continued support, now more crucial then
ever, will help us greatly toward the full realisation of our plans.'84
During 1953 and 1954, ACUE strengthened its ties with US
government. Allen Dulles replaced Walter Bedell Smith as director of
the CIA and the State Department concluded that open attempts at
propelling European states into the EDC during 1953-54 had
backfired badly, being seen as 'undue US intervention' and arousing
'more public antagonism than support'. The wisdom of less direct
methods seemed to be confirmed.85 The biggest problem now facing
ACUE was the German question, and the most interesting example of
this was the attempt to associate Strasbourg with the efforts of the
Free Europe Committee and ACEN. As early as 1953, German and
east European groups were making conflicting irredentist claims
against each others territory. ACEN and Radio Free Europe, not only
anti-Soviet but also anti-German, published documents and maps
that revealed ambitions against the territory of postwar Germany and
areas inhabited by Germans. The German government repeatedly
pressed the US High Commission 'to stop the dissemination of such
anti-German Propaganda'.86 These tensions threatened to disrupt
relations between ACEN and the various west European delegations
at Strasbourg. Efforts to improve coordination between Strasbourg
and the Free Europe Committee led, in early 1957, to an extensive
study of Radio Free Europe's activities by the special political
committee of the Council of Europe. After a three-day visit to its
Munich headquarters, they concluded that Radio Free Europe was
'performing an extremely useful political task' and recommended
greater European participation in what was still a largely American-


OSS, CIA AND EUROPEAN UNITY 209
managed programme. In 1959, the Free Europe Committee
responded by forming a west European advisory group and by
encouraging leaders of Eastern bloc exile groups to join in discussions
on European integration.87
Two further developments characterized ACUE strategy in the
mid-1950s. Firstly, there was revived interest in elite politics, focused
upon Jean Monnet's Action Committee for a United States of
Europe.88 Monnet stressed small meeting and serious publications
'rather than large manifestations and polemics'. Monnet's strategy
was not entirely welcomed by ACUE, who complained that he had
'concentrated deliberately on labour and socialist elements' at the
expense of the participation of French industrialists and the right.89
Although Monnet's activities are specifically identified in ACUE
reports on supported programmes, the documentation linking
Monnet and ACUE is limited. This is not surprising since Monnet
was even more cautious than the European Movement concerning
the potential political damage that might be caused by revelations
about American funding. The only precisely quantifiable American
funds passed to Monnet during this period came through the Ford
Foundation to support his immediate secretariat.'0
The case of Monnet and the Ford Foundation usefully highlights
the extreme difficulties that confront any historian attempting to
disentangle covert American government funding from the overt
funding provided by those American private organizations and public
foundations which worked closely with the US government. As early
as 1949, at the behest of Allen Dulles, the Ford Foundation was
cooperating with the CIA on a number of European programmes.91
By 1950, the ACUE and the Ford Foundation were coordinating their
efforts to support federalism.'2 Moreover, by the mid-1950s, the
senior figures who directed both overt and covert American support
were increasingly synonymous. By 1953 both John J. McCloy and
Shepard Stone, who had been instrumental in arranging for
substantial covert government funds for the European Youth
Campaign, were both on the board of trustees of the Ford
Foundation. McCloy was also a director of the Rockefeller
Foundation. By 1955, McCloy had become chairman of the Ford
Foundation, while serving as chairman of the Council on Foreign
Relations. Simultaneously, the same circle, including Retinger,


210 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT
McCloy, Allen Dulles, Harriman, David Rockefeller, Jackson and
Bedell Smith were busy creating the Bilderberg Group, yet another
organization that bridged the narrowing gaps between government,
private and public organizations and between overt and covert on
both sides of the Atlantic." Monnet's Action Committee and the
European Youth Campaign seem to have been flagship European
activities receiving support from these overlapping American groups
and organizations in the mid-1950s.
The second development was increased ACUE attention to
NATO, which was developing its own programme of political
warfare, and to Atlanticist ideas.'4 In contrast to the early 1950s,
when ACUE had refused to work with the Atlantic Union, by the end
of the decade ACUE were increasingly cooperating with Atlanticist
groups that conceived of European unity in a NATO framework.
ACUE supported youth programmes such as the Atlantic Political
Youth Conferences between 1957 and 1960 and declared that it 'had
long felt that European Unity and Atlantic solidarity are mutually
supporting objectives'.'5 Although, like the American Committee on
NATO, by 1959 a greater proportion of its activities were conducted
within the USA, nevertheless ACUE was still trying to encourage a
stronger British interest in Europe and commissioned a study by the
Economist intelligence unit of economic relations between Britain
and Europe, hoping to persuade British industrialists to take a more
'realistic' view.'6 The Economist staff included a number of figures
who were prominent in European organizations, for example its
deputy editor, Barbara Ward.
In May 1960 the ACUE voted itself out of existence. Its directors
argued that, while European unity was an 'unfinished business',
continued ACUE activity could only be justified by a 'serious reversal
of present trends' towards integration. Moreover, with the recovery
of European economies, European federalists were able to find their
own funds. Thus, during the spring of 1960 the ACUE was gradually
wound down, as the executive director administered the last eight
European grants, totalling $105,000. With many African states
sweeping towards independence, the ACUE toyed briefly with a
Europe-Africa programme designed to tie the two continents
together, but residual ACUE funds were transferred to the American
Committee on NATO. It then deactivated rather than dissolved itself


OSS, CIA AND EUROPEAN UNITY 211
at the request of Monnet and Schuman, who wished to ensure its
'coming back into the picture if and when necessary'.97
The Impact of ACUE
Although ACUE's records are open to public inspection, the precise
nature of its work and the source of all its funds remains somewhat
obscure. For some unknown reason the resources available to ACUE
effectively tripled from the end of 1951. Over their first three years
of operations, 1949-51, ACUE received $384,650, the majority
being dispersed to Europe. This was a large sum, but from 1952 the
ACUE began to spend such a sum annually. The total budget for the
period 1949-60 amounted to between $3 and $4 million.'8 As the
amount of money flowing across the Atlantic began to increase, the
ACUE opened a local Paris office to monitor closely groups that had
received grants. By 1956 the flood of increased funding was
prompting fears amongst the directors of the ACUE that their work
would be made public, arousing criticism of the European groups
they supported. Although their European representative, William
Fuggit, explained that ACUE was 'able to avoid embarrassing our
friends by staying in the background', he conceded that the danger of
discovery 'was real'."
Although the record of ACUE expenditure reveals nothing about
the source of income, the available evidence points firmly to growing
US government subventions. As the historians Trevor Barnes and
Wilson D. Miscamble have shown, in 1948 the US government
attempted to run these sorts of projects on the basis of private
donations only, but this was soon abandoned.100 As late as 1951,
ACUE were still soliciting some donations from private American
citizens, but, thereafter, ACUE ceased to employ a professional
fundraiser.101 This shift coincides with McCloy's intervention,
funnelled via ACUE, to boost campaigns amongst European youth
and a tripling of resources available to ACUE. Braden, in an interview
given in the 1980s, asserted that ACUE funds originated with the CIA
and in memoirs published after his death, Retinger, the Secretary-
General of the European Movement, recounted the receipt of
American government funds and dwelt on periodic accusations that
he was working for American intelligence. But it is the remarkable
212 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT
work of Rebattet, with unparalleled access to European Movement
documentation, that confirms that most ACUE funds originated with
the CIA. Drawing on interviews with George Rabattet, Secretary-
General of the European Movement, and the European Representative
of ACUE, EX. Rabattet concluded:
There were no less than four members of the Central
Intelligence Agency among the Officers and Directors of ACUE
... The vast majority of the American funds devoted to the
campaign for European unity, and practically all the money
received for the European Youth Campaign came from State
Department secret funds. This was of course kept very secret.
ACUE thus played the part of a legal covering organisation.
Donations from business made up a maximum of one sixth of
the total sums during the period under study.
Rebattet demonstrates that by 1952 these American funds were being
hidden by the procedure of keeping most of them out of the ordinary
budget of the European Movement. Instead American funds were
used for innumerable special projects including the European Youth
Campaign, the Action Committee and the budgets of the National
Councils of the European Movements.102
Not all the ACUE's funds came from the CIA; it attracted
substantial private donations. Equally, not all covert American
assistance to European federalist groups was distributed by the
ACUE. For example, in Italy a senior official of the Vatican, Luigi
Gedda, created an organization of Catholic activists which helped to
defeat of the Communists in the elections of 1948. Gedda was
supported by US officials in the US embassy in Rome and in the CIA,
and the support increased when he began to promote the idea of
'Western Union', explaining that the Pope had now agreed that 'the
Church should carry the banner for a federation of western European
states'. After the US embassy in Rome concluded that Gedda needed
about $500,000, US officials debated whether the funding should be
channelled through the Marshall Plan (ERP) publicity fund or the
CIA.103 Mutual Security Agency funds were also used to support the
European Movement, indeed the Mutual Security Act of 1951
explicitly stated that its resources were to be used 'to further encourage
the economic and political federation of Europe'.104 Use was certainly
OSS, CIA AND EUROPEAN UNITY 213
made of counterpart funds - European currencies transferred from
Marshall Plan governments to the American government to cover
American administrative costs in Europe - for political purposes.105
It is difficult to measure the proportion the numerous American
publicity and propaganda budgets, both overt and covert, that was
spent on promoting European unity over this period.106 Nevertheless,
in the specific case of ACUE, a rough measurement can be made by
comparing its total budget of $3-$4 million with those of
contemporaneous programmes mounted by the CIA. The ACUE
clearly cost less than was spent to ensure the defeat of the
Communists in the Italian elections of 1948, probably the CIA's
biggest operation in this period and thought by Christopher Simpson
to have cost approximately $10 million.107 At the same time, the
ACUE spent more than the $3 million spent by the CIA during the
Chilean elections of 1964, and more than the sum of $ 3.3 million
channelled to the American National Student Association between
1952 and 1967. That spending on ACUE was broadly typical of an
important OPC/CIA covert operation in this period is confirmed by
Geoffrey Treverton, who suggested that, under Truman, 81 covert
actions were authorized, and that the total sum authorized grew
dramatically from $4.7 million in 1949 to $82 million in 1952.
ACUE resources also grew dramatically over this same period.108
Nor is it easy to cast up a balanced assessment of what ACUE's
covert operations in Europe achieved between 1949 and 1960.
Clearly, appropriate funding was not available within western Europe
for sorts of initiatives that the European Movement wished to
pursue. Indeed much of the scarce funds available prior to American
involvement came not from western Europe, but from Swiss
industrialists, notably the firm of Nestle's.109 There can be no doubt
that, between 1949 and 1951, ACUE funds propped up the executive
of the European Movement, which seemed terminally split and was
approaching bankruptcy. One-third of the European Movement's
office staff had been laid off, the publication programme had been
halted and bills were not being paid. As the ACUE noted ruefully in
late 1949 'Sandys urgently requests more money from us by the end
of January'.110 Once the core of European Movement had been
stabilized, its expensive public campaigns of the 1950s relied almost
entirely on ACUE funds. When a French delegate from the European
214 DIPLOMACY 6c STATECRAFT
Union of Federalists arrived in New York in 1950 to deliver a
presentation to ACUE on its plans for the European Council of
Vigilance, he conceded that 'it is simply impossible for us to carry out
the enterprise without your help'."1 Federalists had outlined the mass
European Youth Campaign on paper as early as 1947, but the means
were not at hand and the project had been 'indefinitely postponed'.112
That European Movement was itself federal, consisting of many
national and international groups, together with the creation of
special budgets to render the American contribution opaque, makes
it awkward to quantify the proportion of its funds arriving from
Europe and the United States respectively. Rebattet's figures for the
period 1945-53, based on complete access to European Movement
financial records, suggest that, of the approximately £1,000,000
spent from 1945 to the beginning of 1953, 'about £440,000' (44 per
cent) came from the United States. If we discount European funds
received prior to that start of American financial involvement in late
1948 (about £100,000), it appears that ACUE provided almost
exactly half the European Movement funds from late 1948 through
to early 1953. It is clear from ACUE financial records that 1949-52
was a period of modest contributions and thereafter these more than
doubled. There are no precise figures for European Movement
budgets between 1953 and 1960, but it would be surprising if ACUE
subventions did not constitute two-thirds of European Movement
funds during this latter period.1"
The impact of ACUE upon the European Movement is
undeniable. But the impact of ACUE-supported activities upon
European populations is hard to determine, partly because the
existence of popular European federalism in postwar Europe has
itself become a controversial question. Although the work of the
various federalist organizations, which coalesced under the umbrella
of the European Movement by 1947, is massively documented by
Walter Lipgens, they had almost no influence on the negotiations that
led to the Schuman Plan or to any other landmark event in the
process of unification."4 Spaak, Count Sforza, the Italian Foreign
Minister, and other European leaders who advocated popularism
expected this to create indirect pressure upon officials and ministers,
but overestimated the influence of public opinion. Outside France,
Europeans were not roused to enthusiasm by the federalist cause.
OSS, CIA AND EUROPEAN UNITY 215
Even the European Youth Campaign, which had held 2,000 youth
meetings across Europe by 1956, was dependent upon the
participation of organized European youth, through the affiliation of
their leadership. Their well-attended meetings may offer little more
evidence of popular sentiment than contemporaneous rallies of
'democratic' youth held in eastern Europe, which they were expressly
designed to counter.115
All this activity did create enough semblance of public pressure,
however, to bother federalism's most implacable opponents. As early
as April 1950, Labour Party leaders complained of 'a lot of pressure
from European and US public opinion'. At the same time, seemingly
convinced that popular sentiment had no place in the making of
foreign policy, they were adamantly ignoring it. In November 1950,
the British Labour Party delegation returned from Strasbourg and
reported with satisfaction that the federalists had been defeated, 'and
their attempts to upset the Assembly's work through Committees of
Vigilance, proved a lamentable failure'.116
The faith of ACUE in the role of public pressure is not difficult to
understand, given the more populist traditions of American foreign
policymaking. ACUE's misplaced confidence in the ease with which
Europe could be propelled down the road to federalism mirrors the
expectations of US officials within ERP and ECA, who would find
European institutions and society less permeable to American ideas
and practices than they had hoped.117 But the firm faith in the role of
populism expressed by Spaak, Sforza and periodically Monnet is
harder to explain. Monnet's extraordinary claim in 1952 that the
European Coal and Steel Community was a sovereign power, responsible
not to the states that had created it, but only to the European
Assembly at Strasbourg and to the European Court of Justice is but
one example.118 The idea that a few million dollars of covert US funds
might release a wave of irresistible mass pressure for federalism in
Europe was misconceived and, with hindsight, ludicrous. That a
number of prominent figures on both sides of the Atlantic believed it
to be possible is significant in itself.
Viewed from Europe, the most striking aspect of the ACUE's work
is the extent to which officials working for European reconstruction
and unification shared the experience of wartime intelligence, special
operations and resistance. European unity had taken root in wartime
216 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT
resistance movements.1" These links with clandestine organizations
continue into the postwar period. The emerging European
Community and the growing Western intelligence community
overlapped to a considerable degree. This is firmly underlined by the
creation of Retinger's Bilderberg Group, an informal secretive
transatlantic council of key decisionmakers developed between 1952
and 1954. The Bilderberg Group grew out of the same overlapping
networks of drawn from the European Community and the Western
intelligence community. Bilderberg was founded by Joseph Retinger
and Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands in 1952 in response to the
rise of anti-Americanism in western Europe and was designed to
define some sort of Atlantic consensus amid diverging European and
American outlooks. It brought leading European and American
personalities together once a year for an informal discussion of their
differences. Retinger secured support from Averell Harriman, David
Rockefeller and Bedell Smith. The formation of the American wing
of Bilderberg was entrusted to Eisenhower's psychological warfare
coordinator, CD. Jackson, and the funding for the first meeting, held
at the Hotel de Bilderberg in Holland in 1954, was provided by the
CIA. Thereafter, much of its funding came from the Ford
Foundation. By 1958, those attending Bilderberg included McCloy,
Dean Acheson, George Ball and Paul Nitze. It is striking that three
important transnational elite groups emerging in the 1950s: the
European Movement, the Bilderberg Group and Jean Monnet's
Action Committee for a United States of Europe all shared the
broadly the same origins and sources of support.'20
Although Bilderberg and ACUE-European Movement shared
broadly the same founders, members and objectives, arguably
Bilderberg constituted the more effective mechanism of transatlantic
dialogue, developing into what some have regarded as the most
significant discreet forum for Western elites. Unlike ACUE-European
Movement, it was not constrained by subject, nor was it divided into
separate European and American bodies, linked by the activities of
scurrying envoys. The subjects over which the annual meetings
ranged were too wide, even in the formal sessions, to permit detailed
analysis here, but it is clear that the Rome Treaty was nurtured by
discussions at Bilderberg in the preceding year. In the mid-1950s the
European delegates were most concerned to use Bilderberg to
OSS, CIA AND EUROPEAN UNITY 217
underline the damage being done to the standing of the United States
by McCarthyism in general and the Rosenberg trial in particular. In
1954, CD. Jackson went out of his way to assure the European
delegates that McCarthy would be gone by the time of the next
meeting - and he was. In the 1960s the focus shifted to the Third
World and development issues. The value of Bilderberg is impossible
to assess, but there has been consistent top-level attendance,
including every British Prime Minister over three decades. This,
together with its eventual development in the 1970s into the
Trilateral Commission with the incorporation of Japan, suggests that
the participants have considered it worthwhile.121
Seen from the United States, ACUE's history reveals the style of
early covert action, not least the reliance on private organizations,
albeit coordinated by a close circle of officials. Allen Dulles, Braden
and Bedell Smith all played a prominent role in ACUE before moving
to formal positions within the CIA in the early 1950s. The precise
nature of the linkage between groups like ACUE and the CIA will not
be known until the full records of the CIA's International
Organizations Division is released, and that may not be for some
considerable time.'22 Nevertheless, the work of Allen Dulles and
Braden with ACUE and the Free Europe Committee clearly
prompted them to set up the International Organizations Division in
1951. From the point of view of the development of CIA doctrine
and structure this was an important moment.
The most interesting links between ACUE and International
Organizations Division relate not to the work they conducted in
Europe, but instead to their work conducted by ACUE inside the
United States which, though limited, may well have been illegal. It
was the International Organizations Division that continued this
domestic theme in the work of the CIA through the 1950s, typified
by the funding of the American National Student Association from
1952. This controversial penchant for international operations which
took place in the United States as well as overseas would have longterm
significance for the American intelligence community. It was,
above all, revelations in 1967 about these activities inside the United
States that initiated the wave of enquiries and restrictions that would
descend upon the CIA by the mid-1970s. Eventually, the reverberations
of ACUE, International Organizations Division and the associated
218 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT
concepts they developed were felt as strongly in Washington as they
were in Europe.123
University of Nottingham
NOTES
The author would like to acknowledge the support of the American Council of Learned
Societies, the Economic and Social Research Council and the Fulbright Commission in
conducting research for this article. Thanks are due to several individuals who kindly
commented on earlier drafts including: Mark Deavin, Edward Ingram, Rhodri Jeffreys-
Jones, W. Scott Lucas, Geoffrey Warner and John W Young. Errors remain the
responsibility of the author.
1. On intelligence and the Cold War see John L. Gaddis, 'Intelligence, Espionage and
Cold War Origins', Diplomatic History, xiii (1989), pp.191-213; Sheila Kerr,
'NATO's First Spies: The Case of the Disappearing Diplomats - Guy Burgess and
Donald Maclean', in Beatrice Heuser and Robert O'Neill (eds.), Securing the Peace in
Europe, 194S-62 (London, 1991), pp.118-24; Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of
Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War (Stanford,
1992), pp. 183-92; Richard J. Aldrich (ed.), British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold
War, 1945-51 (London, 1992), pp.1-17.
2. John Gillingham, Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955: The Germans
and French from the Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community (Cambridge, 1992),
pp.148-78; Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51
(Berkeley, 1984), pp.56-84; Sallie Pisani, The CIA and the Marshall Plan (Edinburgh,
1991), pp.34-58; Geoffrey Warner, 'Eisenhower, Dulles and the Unity of Western
Europe, 1955-1957', International Affairs, lxix (1993), p.320.
3. OSS-CIA efforts to promote European unification have not received sustained
analysis. Nevertheless, brief references have continued to surface over the years:
Trevor Barnes, 'The Secret Cold War: The CIA and American Foreign Policy in
Europe, 1945-1956, Part II', The Historical Journal, XXV (1982), pp.666-7; Robert
Eringer, The Global Manipulators : The Bilderberg Group, the Trilateral Commission,
Covert Power Groups of the West (Bristol, 1980), pp.19-20; Richard Fletcher, Who
Were They Travelling With? (Nottingham, 1977), p.71; Pierre Melandri, Les Etats
XJnis face a I'unification de I'Europe, 1945-54 (Paris, 1980), pp.320, 354-5; Peter
Thompson, 'Bilderberg and the West', in Holly Sklar (ed.), Trilateralism, The
Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World Management (Boston, 1980),
p.184; Arnold Zurcher, The Struggle to Unite Europe, 1940-58 (New York, 1977),
p.71.
4. For a discussion of the European and particularly the British aspects of this issue see,
Richard J. Aldrich, 'European Integration: An American Intelligence Connection', in
Anne Deighton (ed.), Building European Unity: National Decision-Makers and
European Institutions, 1948-63 (London, 1995), pp.159-79.
5. F.X. Rebattet, 'The "European Movement" 1945-53: A Study in National and
International Non-Governmental Organisations working for European Unity'
(D.Phil., St Antony's, Oxford, 1962). F.X. Rebattet was the son of George Rebattet,
Deputy Secretary General of the European Movement, 1948-52 and Secretary-
General, 1952-5.
6. The independent-minded efforts of the AFL-CIO are the most obvious example,
Irwin M. Wall, The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954
OSS, CIA AND EUROPEAN UNITY 219
(Cambridge, 1991), pp.99-104, 151-3, 211-15; Pisani, The CIA and the Marshall
Plan, pp.99-100, 119, 145; Frederico Romero, The United States and the European
Trade Union Movement, 1944-51 (Chapel Hill, 1993), pp.12-17, 88-95.
7. Peter Coleman, The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the
Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe (New York, 1990), p.xi. See also William
Colby, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York, 1978), pp.51-107.
8. Christopher Thorne, 'American Political Culture and the End of the Cold War',
Journal of American Studies xxvi (1992), pp.316-20; Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall
Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-52
(Cambridge, 1987), pp.213-14, 332-3.
9. Kennan was responding to a document entitled 'OPC Projects Fiscal 1949-1950'.
Kennan to Wisner, 6 Jan. 1949, Political and Psychological Warfare file, box 12,
Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-53, Lot Files 64 D 563, RG 59, NA.
10. NSC 10/2, 'National Security Directive on Office of Special Projects', 18 June 1948,
reprinted in Thomas H. Etzold and John L. Gaddis (eds.), Containment: Documents
on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-50 (New York, 1978), pp. 125-8. For a short
period OPC was known as Office of Special Projects.
11. Lovett to Kennan, 29 Oct. 1948, Political and Psychological Warfare file, box 12,
Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-53, Lot Files 64 D 563, RG 59, NA.
12. Geo L. King (OPC) to Bedell Smith, 25 Aug. 1950, Personal Correspondence file K,
box 14, Walter Bedell Smith Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas
(hereafter DDE). The fullest account of the tangled CIA-OPC relations in the late
1940s is given in A.B. Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of
Government to 1950 (Pennsylvania, 1990), pp.273-81, 303-11. CIA planning
during the 1950s is described in David Attlee Phillips, The Nightwatch: 25 years
Inside the CIA (London, 1977), pp.56-60.
13. 'List of State and Foreign Service Personnel having knowledge of political warfare
operations', undated, Political and Psychological Warfare 1948-50 file, box 11A,
Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-53, Lot Files 64 D 563, RG 59, NA;
Kennan to Lovett, 29 Oct. 1948, Political and Psychological Warfare file, box 12,
ibid.
14. On this see James E. Miller, 'Taking off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian
Elections of 1948', Diplomatic History, vii (1983), 35-46; David W. Ellwood, 'The
1948 Elections in Italy: A Cold War Propaganda Battle', Historical Journal of Film,
Radio and Television, xiii (1993), pp.19-35.
15. Romero has argued that while 'operations to support non-communist union in Italy
and France 'were financed in large measure by the CIA', the role of intelligence
agencies should not be exaggerated, The United States and the European Trade Union
Movement, pp.94-6; Ronald L. Filippelli, American Labour and Postwar Italy: A
Study in Cold War Politics (Stanford, 1989); Dennis MacShane, International Labour
and the Origins of the Cold War (Oxford, 1992); Lutz Niethammer, 'Structural
Reform and a Compact for Growth; Conditions for a United Labour Union in West
Europe after the Collapse of Fascism', in Charles S. Maier (ed.), The Origins of the
Cold War and Contemporary Europe (New York, 1978), pp.216-28; Ronald Radosh,
American Labour and United States Foreign Policy (New York, 1969); Carol
Eisenberg, 'Working Class Politics and the Cold War: American Intervention in the
German Labour Movement, 1945-9', Diplomatic History, vii (1983), pp.283-306.
16. Coleman, Liberal Conspiracy; Cord Meyer, Facing Reality: From World Federalism to
the CIA (New York, 1982), pp.66-7.
17. Braden's own recollections are recounted in Barnes, 'The Secret Cold War',
pp.666-7, and in Thomas W Braden, 'The Birth of the CIA', American Heritage,
xxviii (1977), pp.4-13. See also Miles Copeland, The Real Spy World (London,
220 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT
1974), p.230. By 1954 the International Organisations Division, was 'one of the
major operating divisions of the Directorate of Plans', Meyer, Facing Reality, p.85.
18. Meyer, Facing Reality, pp. 110-39; John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline
of the CIA (London, 1986), pp.133-8; Christopher Simpson, Blowback: America's
Recruitment of Nazis and its Effects on the Cold War (London, 1988), pp.138-56;
Aaron Bank, From OSS to the Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces (Novato CA,
1986), pp.138-89. One of the most reliable accounts of the establishment of staybehind
networks is given in Colby, Honorable Men, pp.51-107.
19. Zurcher, The Struggle to Unite Europe, p.24; Rebattet, 'European Movement',
pp.294-6; R.B. Manderson-Jones, The Special Relationship, Anglo-American
Relations and Western European Unity, 1947-S6 (London, 1972), p.13.
20. Letter from Duncan Sandys to Beddington-Behrens, 11 Oct. 1948; 'Report by
Chairman of Finance Sub-Committee', 8 Dec. 1948, EX/P/53, European Movement
Archives, cited in Rebattet, 'European Movement', p.195. It appears that Retinger
has undertaken a previous unsuccessful search for support in the United States in
November 1946, meeting Adolfe Berle and George S. Franklin, but nothing came of
this, ibid, p.299.
21. Coudenhove-Kalergi to Donovan, 24 Nov. 1949, box 38, Allen W Dulles Papers,
Mudd Library, Princeton University; minutes of the Second Meeting of the Executive
Committee, 1 July 1949, folder 90, ACUE records, Special Collections, Lauinger
Library, Georgetown University, Washington DC (hereafter ACUE records, LL);
Churchill to Donovan, private, 4 June 1949, ibid. For an example of Coudenhove-
Kalergi's inter-war work see his Pan-Europa (London, 1926).
22. WS. Churchill, War Speeches, Vol.11 (London, 1951), pp.427-8.
23. WS. Churchill, The Sinews of Peace (London, 1956) p.44
24. John W. Young, France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance, 1945-9 (Leicester,
1990), pp.210-14; John W. Young, Britain and European Unity, 1945-93 (Leicester,
1993), pp.4-6, 22-3; John Pinder, 'Prophet Not Without Honour: Lothian and the
Federal Idea', in John Turner (ed.), The Larger Idea: Lord Lothian and the Problem
of National Sovereignty (London, 1988), pp.144-7.
25. Memorandum by Robert Joyce to Frank Wisner, 'National Committee for Free
Europe', 19 Oct. 1950, Political and Psychological Warfare file, box 12, Records of
the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-53, Lot Files 64 D 563, RG 59, NA. On the origins
of the Free Europe Committee see Wilson D. Miscamble, George F. Kennan and The
Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950 (New Jersey, 1992), pp.203-5.
26. Meyer, Facing Reality, pp.110-11. Dolbeare had joined OSS in 1940 and had
become a senior officer in the secret intelligence branch of OSS. On Free Europe
Committee funding see Meyer, Facing Reality, pp.110, 116, and the iconoclastic
memorandum by General Crittenberger, 21 April 1958, Free Europe Committee
1958 file, box 44, CD. Jackson Papers, DDE.
27. Filippelli, American Labour, p.134. Other committees included the American
Committee to Aid the Survivors of the German Resistance. Allen W. Dulles, The
Marshall Plan (2nd edn., Oxford, 1992); Ben Pimlott (ed.), The Political Diary of
Hugh Dalton: 1918-40, 1945-60 (London, 1986), entry for Tuesday 29 July 1947,
p.401.
28. Donovan worked as a consultant to the State Department on a number of political
warfare projects, handled the legal negotiations over Chinese airliners stranded in
Hong Kong in 1949 that were then transferred to the CIA, and ran a special
operations project while simultaneously serving as Ambassador to Thailand. NSC
5430, 'Status of US Program for National Security as of 30 June 1954, Part 7, USIA
Program', 18 Aug. 1954, FRUS, 1952-4, II, p.1780; Banks, From OSS to the Green
Berets, pp. 186-7.
OSS, CIA AND EUROPEAN UNITY 221
29. Darling, CIA, pp.267-8, 301-45. Allen Dulles had also exercised influence over
labour affairs in the American zone of Germany in the period 1945-6, Eisenberg,
'Working Class Politics and the Cold War', p.288. Thomas W Braden appears to have
ceased to Executive Director in the spring of 1951. He was succeeded by William P.
Durkee and then by Alan Hovey in 1953. Durkee had served in OSS with Braden and
later became vice-president of Free Europe Inc. with special responsibility for Radio
Free Europe. On Braden's departure see Braden to Sandys, 30 March 1951, and
Sandys to Braden, 17 April 1951, 9/1/10, Duncan Sandys Papers, Churchill College,
Cambridge (hereafter CCC).
30. List of ACUE Directors attached to details of a visit by Robert Schuman, 20 Sept.
1950, folder 5, ACUE records, LL; Filippelli, American Labour, pp.112, 134-5, 211.
31. 'Report to the Executive Directors of the American Committee on United Europe',
by William P.Durkee, May 1952, ACUE file 2, box 4, Walter Bedell Smith Papers,
DDE (All subsequent references to WBS, DDE, are to this single voluminous file on
ACUE.)
32. William J. Donovan, 'The Schuman Plan', Feb. 1952, ibid.
33. 'Report to the Executive Directors of the American Committee on United Europe' by
William E Durkee, May 1952, WBS, DDE.
34. Churchill to Donovan, private, 4 June 1949, folder 90, ACUE records, LL.
35. Meyer, Facing Reality, pp.63-66; John Pomian (ed.), Joseph Retinger: The Memoirs
of an Eminence Grise (Sussex, 1972), p.237; Aldrich, 'European Integration',
pp.163-4.
36. Churchill to Donovan, private, 4 June 1949, folder 90, ACUE records, LL. Churchill
maintained his intelligence connections after 1945, on this see for example Martin
Gilbert, Winston Churchill, Vol III: Never Despair (London, 1988), p.424.
37. Address by Churchill to the ACUE, New York, 29 March 1949, folder 2, ACUE
records, LL.
38. These ideas were reflected in the title of ACUE's earlier manifestation, see minutes
of the American Committee for a Free and United Europe, 5 Jan. 1949, folder 90,
ACUE records, LL.
39. Minutes of a discussion between Kennan by Hayter (UK JIC chairman), 26 July 1949,
W627/2/500G, FO 371/76383, PRO. American intelligence estimates and British
PUSC Papers were also exchanged.
40. Braden to Bedell Smith, 28 Dec. 1949, WBS, DDE. Initial funding in 1949 appears
to have come from private sources: at the incorporation of the ACUE the luncheon
in honour of Winston Churchill raised $75,000. 'Report to the Directors of the
ACUE', by William P Durkee, May 1952, pp.7-8, WBS, DDE.
41. Donovan went on to attend a Paris meeting on the Schuman Plan, Confidential
Memorandum enclosed in Braden to Bedell Smith, 27 June 1950, WBS, DDE. On
Labour's changing attitude to Europe, see John W. Young, Britain, France and the
Unity of Europe, 1945-51 (Leicester, 1984).
42. 'Report to the Directors of the ACUE', by William P. Durkee, May 1952, pp.7-8,
WBS, DDE; Rebattet, 'European Movement', pp.49, 186; Aldrich, 'European
Integration', p.165. On Sandys in 1945 see Young, Britain and European Unity,
pp. 19-20.
43. 'Report to the Directors of the ACUE', by William P. Durkee, May 1952, pp.9-10,
WBS, DDE.
44. Confidential Memorandum enclosed in Braden to Bedell Smith, 27 June 1950, WBS,
DDE.
45. Retinger to Sandys, 31 March 1950, European Movement Archives, quoted in
Rebattet, 'European Movement', p.408.
46. Rebattet, 'European Movement', pp.198-9. Hitherto the ACUE had offered little
222 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT
specific direction as to precise use of the funds, remarking in January 1950, 'up to
now all funds have been sent to the European Movement to use as it sees fit', minutes
of the Meeting of the Executive Committee, ACUE, 20 Jan. 1950, WBS, DDE.
47. 'Report to the Directors of the ACUE', by William P. Durkee, May 1952, pp.7-8,
WBS, DDE. Subsequently, Braden sent a highly confidential report to Walter Bedell
Smith, relating the discovery that during early 1950, 'Sandys [had] attempted to
disband the European Movement'. He added that 'Spaak and Retinger together have
handled the Sandys situation ... and kept the whole fracas from reaching the public',
Braden, confidential memorandum on ACUE to Bedell Smith, 6 July 1950, WBS,
DDE..
48. Gillingham, Coal, Steel, and the rebirth of Europe, p.147. Another historian has
identified a 'long American intrigue to make him "director-general" of the OEEC,
Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation State (London, 1992), p.324.
49. Confidential memorandum enclosed in Braden to Bedell Smith, 27 June 1950, WBS,
DDE.
50. Nevertheless, see the excellent account of OPC-PPS linkage based on interviews in
Miscamble, George F. Kennan, pp.199-205.
51. Memorandum of the tripartite preliminary meetings on Items 5 and 8, MIN/TR/P/4,
9 May 1950, FRUS, 1950, III, p.1081; Elsey to Lloyd, 16 May 1951, enclosing
special guidance memorandum by policy advisory staff, 'The Concept of Europe', 8
May 1951, Declassified Document Reference System, 1, 3 (1975), p.l76D. Lloyd
noted 'I agree, it sounds very good'.
52. Miscamble, George F. Kennan, pp.284-5; minutes of a discussion between Kennan
and Hayter(JIC chairman), 26 July 1949, W627/2/500G, FO 371/76383, PRO.
53. Memorandum of a conversation between Acheson, Kennan, Spaak and Silvercruys,
19 Jan. 1950, FRUS, 1950, III, pp.613-14; minutes of the 7th meeting of the policy
planning staff, ibid., pp.617-20. See also Gillingham, Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of
Europe, pp.134-7, 147-8.
54. Acting Secretary of State to Donovan, 29 Sept. 1950, Exhibit 6, Appendix IV, May
1952, WBS, DDE. On British policy during this period see also Edmund Dell, The
Schuman Plan and the British Abdication of Leadership in Europe (Oxford, 1995),
pp.90-109.
55. Meetings of US ambassadors in Paris, 21 Oct. 1949, FRUS 1949, IV, pp.490-93;
memorandum of a conversation between Harriman, Bruce and McCloy, 20 Jan.
1950, FRUS, 1950, III, pp.1608-9; meetings of US ambassadors in Rome, 22-24
Mar. 1950, FRUS, 1950, III, p.809.
56. Braden, confidential memorandum on the ACUE, to Bedell Smith, 6 July 1950, WBS,
DDE. In his memoirs Spaak praises Harriman as a man who was both 'discreet' and
shared the 'vision of a united Europe', The Continuing Battle: The Memoirs of a
European 1936-66 (London, 1971), p.194. Katz subsequently became a Professor of
International Law at Harvard University, R. Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of
America's First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkeley, 1972), p.104.
57. Gillingham, Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, p.109.
58. Braden, confidential memorandum on the ACUE, to Bedell Smith, 6 July 1950, WBS,
DDE.
59. Report to the Directors of the ACUE, by William P. Durkee, May 1952, pp.6-7,
WBS, DDE, Aldrich, 'European Integration, pp.168-9.
60. Braden to Bedell Smith, 28 Dec. 1949, WBS, DDE. On Britain's 'obstructionism' at
Strasbourg in the summer of 1950 see Anderson to State Department, 31 July 1950,
FRUS, 1950, III, pp.777-80.
61. A copy of the Mackay Plan is available at fo. 7, file 2, group 7, Mackay Papers, British
Library of Economic and Political Science (hereafter BLPES); 'Report to the Directors
OSS, CIA AND EUROPEAN UNITY 223
of the ACUE', by William P. Durkee, May 1952, pp.6-7, 10-11, 14-15, WBS, DDE;
minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee, ACUE, 20 Jan. 1950, WBS,
DDE. Diary entry for 11 Sept. 1948, Dalton Diary, ed. Pimlott, p.440.
62. Aldrich, 'European integration', pp.168-8. The ACUE agreed on a sum of $10,000
for Mackay to pay expenses specifically in support of getting the plan accepted,
minutes of annual meeting, 24 April 1951, WBS, DDE.
63. Retinger to Cripps, 7 Feb. 1950, UP3117/2, FO 371/88643, PRO; Hooper minutes,
8 and 10 Feb. 1950, Makins and Jebb minutes 9 Feb. 1950, ibid. See also Curtins to
Retinger, 1 Jan. 1950, 9/1/10, Duncan Sandys Papers, CCC. The letters were
eventually published by ACUE in a booklet The Union of Europe: Declarations of
European Statesmen (New York, 1950), ibid.
64. Donovan, report from Strasbourg, 5 Dec. 1951, folder 58, ACUE records, LL;
'Report to the Directors of the ACUE', by William P Durkee, May 1952, pp.6-7,
14-15, WBS, DDE.
65. Address by Paul-Henri Spaak, 1 April 1952, New York, folder 9, ACUE records, LL;
Address by Paul van Zeeland to ACUE, New York, 4 Oct. 1949, folder 4, ACUE
records, LL; Address by Paul-Henri Spaak to World Affairs Council, Seattle and the
University of Washington, 26 Jan. 1951, folder 7, ibid. Address by Robert Schuman
to ACUE, New York, 20 Sept. 1950, folder 5, ibid.; Address by Konrad Adenauer to
ACUE, 16 April 1953, folder 11, ibid.; address by Guy Mollet to ACUE, 6 Sept.
1955, folder 13, ibid.
66. Rebattet, 'European Movement', p.308.
67. Publications produced by the ACUE in 1950 and 'given wide distribution to editors,
educators, labour leaders, industry and government' included: Why the United States
Needs a United Europe and Britain's Problem in European Union, see 'Program and
Budget for 1950', p.5, WBS, DDE.
68. 'Statement of General William J. Donovan, ACUE to Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives', 3 March 1950, folder 56, ACUE records, LL; Bonnet to
Donovan, 26 June 1950, and attached note to Bedell Smith, WBS, DDE; ACUE
newsletter, nos. 1-20, folder 64, ACUE records, LL.
69. 'Report to the Directors of the ACUE', by William E Durkee, May 1952, p.19, WBS,
DDE, ibid.; Appendix IV exhibit 4, 'material published by the ACUE and
Publications Distributed', ibid.
70. Braden, 'Activities of the ACUE', p.13, April 1950, folder 20, ACUE records, LL;
'Report to the Directors of the ACUE', by William P. Durkee, May 1952, p. 19, WBS,
DDE, ibid.; The ACUE planned to allocate $62,500 to research on federalism at
Harvard Law School in 1952.
71. See, for example, his studies, Federalism: Trends in Theory and Practice (New York,
1968); Europe: An Emergent Nation? (New York, 1969). On Friedrich's ideas, see in
particular Simon F. Tormey, Making Sense of Tyranny (Manchester, 1995).
72. Hovey to Radox, 10 July 1953, Hovey file, box 19, Friedrich Papers, HUG (FP) -
17, 12, Harvard University Archives (hereafter HUA); Hovey to Friedrich, 13 July
1953, Hovey file, box 19, Friedrich Papers, HUG (FP) - 17, 12, HUA; Friedrich to
Hovey, 20 July 1953, ibid.; Friedrich to Hovey, 24 May 1956, ibid.
73. Carl Friedrich (ed.), The Soviet Zone of Germany (Subcontractor's monograph,
HRAF-34, Harvard-1, 1956); Friedrich to Altschud, 1 Jan. 1951, NCFE file, box 28,
Friedrich Papers, HUG (FP) - 17, 12, HUA.
74. Allen Dulles to Friedrich, 11 Jan. 1951, NCFE file, box 28, Friedrich Papers, HUG
(FP) - 17, 12, HUA; Clay to Friedrich, 15 Jan. 1951, ibid.; Jackson to Friedrich, 31
Jan. 1951, ibid.
75. Braden to Langer, 12 Jan. 1950, file: ACUE, box 9, Langer papers, HUA; Langer to
Braden, 20 Jan. 1950, ibid.; Burkhardt to Langer, 24 July 1950, file; B-General, box
224 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT
9, Langer papers, HUA. On Langer's career in OSS and subsequently CIA see Robin
Winks, Cloak and Gown: Scholars in America's Secret War (London, 1987),
pp.79-82, 495-6.
76. Rebattet, 'European Movement', p.34. See also Thierry Grosbois, Lidée europeenne
en temps de guerre 1940-1944 (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1995).
77. 'Report on the College of Europe' by RC. Dodd, ACUE Scholar, June 1951, folder
1, ACUE records, LL.
78. 'Program and Budget for 1950', p.6, WBS, DDE.
79. Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Committee, ACUE, 11 Oct. 1950, WBS,
DDE; memorandum concerning the International Campaign for the Creation of a
European Council of Vigilance, 1950, ibid.; minutes of the meeting of the Executive
Committee, ACUE, 11 Oct. 1950, ibid.; 'Report to the Directors of the ACUE', by
William P. Durkee, May 1952, pp.11-12, ibid.
80. Donovan to Bedell Smith, 25 July 1951, WBS, DDE. German activities included an
ACUE-sponsored German-Europe conference at Hamburg in November 1951,
minutes of the meeting of the Executive Committee, ACUE, 11 Oct. 1950, WBS,
DDE, pp.12, 17-18. On worries over Germany, see Leffler, A Preponderance of
Power, pp.318-19, 323.
81. 'Report by M. Moreau, Secretary General of the European Youth Campaign, to the
International Executive Bureau of the European Movement', BE/P/60, European
Movement Archives and interview with G. Rebattet, cited in Rebattet, 'European
Movement', pp.449-50. On McCloy's interest in covert activities, see Kai Bird, The
Chairman: John J. McCIoy, The Making of the American Establishment (New York,
1992), Chapter 17, 'McCloy and US Intelligence Operations in Germany', pp.345-58.
82. BE/M/8, Luxemburg, 21 May 1948, p.2, European Movement Archives, and
BE/M/14, Paris, 23 November 1953, p.3, ibid., quoted in Rebattet, 'European
Movement', p.201.
83. European Youth Campaign, 1953, CCS/P/2, box 1, ACUE collection, Hoover
Institute on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford (hereafter HIWRP). Much of the
youth campaign material has survived in the archives at Stanford, see, for example,
Bulletin d'Information des Jeunesses Europeenes Federalistes, Dec. 1951, box 2;
Europa-Union, 3 Jahrgang 1952, and Jugend Europas, May 1954, box 3, ibid..
Monnet to Donovan, 3 Oct. 1952, folder 61, ACUE records, LL.
84. 'Reports to the Directors of ACUE', by William P. Durkee, July 1951 and May 1952,
WBS, DDE. Rebattet suggest that all the resources for the European Youth Campaign
cam from the ACUE which acted as 'a covering organisation' for the United States
government and that £444,080, was transferred for this purpose between 1 May
1951 and 31 May 1953. On this see FIN/P/6, 'European Movement: European Youth
Campaign, Treasurer's Report', 1 Sept. 1953, European Movement Archives cited in,
Rebattet, 'European Movement', pp.206-7.
85. Warner, 'Eisenhower, Dulles and the Unity of Western Europe', pp.320-23, Allen
Dulles succeeded Bedell Smith on 26 Feb. 1953.
86. Chipman (HICOG) to State Department, 'Eastern Propaganda of the National
Committee for a Free Europe', 15 Jan. 1953, 540.40/1-1953, RG 59, NA.
87. Vilis Mosens (Chairman ACEN) to Philips, 13 March 1956, File: Eastern
Europe/Nationalism in Europe, Labour Party International Department records (post
1947), National Museum of Labour History (hereafter NMLH); 'Proposed West
European Advisory Committee', 1 Feb. 1959, Free Europe Committee file, Box 44,
C.D. Jackson papers, DDE.
88. For an example of associated publicity materials see, L'Action Federaliste europeene,
June 1957, box 6, ACUE collection, HIWRP.
89. Meeting of the Board of Directors, 6 June 1956, folder 91, ACUE records, LL.
OSS, CIA AND EUROPEAN UNITY 225
90. One of his closest assistants, his principal private secretary, recalls that: 'He made it
plain on many occasions that CIA or quasi-CIA funds must be avoided because of the
political risks to his prestige', correspondence from François Duchene to the author,
3 Feb. 1995. I am most grateful to François Duchene for sharing his recollections
with me.
91. Pisani, The CIA and the Marshall Plan, pp.47-52.
92. Rebattet, 'European Movement', p.315.
93. Bird, The Chairman, pp.416-17; 471-2; François Duchene, Jean Monnet: The First
Statesman of Interdependence (New York, 1994), p.339.
94. Kuhn memorandum, 'Non-military Activities of NATO', 9 July 1950, File: TS, Box
4, Records of the Office of European Regional Affairs (1946-53), J. Graham Parsons,
Lot Files 55 D 115, RG 59, NA.
95. Ibid.; Foster to Hughes, 6 March 1959, folder 89, ACUE records, LL; ACUE was the
largest financial contributor to the costs of the 1960 conference ($32,707), Karp to
Franklin, 2 Sept. 1960, enclosing Report on Second Atlantic Conference of Young
Political Leaders, folder 87, ACUE records, LL.
96. White (American Committee on NATO) to Karp, 17 Sept. 1959, folder 89, ACUE
records, LL. The Economist study cost $11,200 to commission, 'Report to the
Directors' by Foster, p.13, Oct. 1959, folder 100, ACUE records, LL.
97. 'Memorandum to the Board of Directors' by Alex Hovey, 6 April 1960, folder 94,
ACUE records, LL.
98. ACUE statement of Receipts and Disbursements, 16 Feb. 1949 through 31 Jan. 1952,
WBS, DDE. ACUE's budget for 1952 was $400,000. Appendix IV, Exhibit 1, 'Report
to the Directors of the ACUE', by William P. Durkee, May 1952, WBS, DDE; Bedell
Smith to Donovan, 12 Jan. 1953, ibid. See also Alex Hovey, memorandum to the
Board of Directors, 6 April 1960, folder 94, ACUE records, LL.
99. Minutes of Annual Meeting, 24 April 1951, WBS, DDE; minutes of a meeting of the
Board of Directors, 6 June 1956, folder 91, ACUE records, LL.
100. Barnes, 'The Secret Cold War', pp.666-7; Pomian (ed.), Memoirs of an Eminence
Grise, pp.216, 228, 237; Miscamble, George F. Kennan, p.204.
101. Connely to Bedell Smith, 16 Feb. 1952, WBS, DDE; minutes of a meeting of the
Board of Directors, 6 June 1956, folder 91, ACUE records, LL.
102. Rebattet, 'European Movement', pp.314-15. Rebattet's review of documentation in
the European Movement's archives shows that these contain the minutes of the
ACUE Board of Directors meetings discussing funding.
103. Page to Kennan, 11 Oct. 1948, 865.00/10/1148, RG 59, NA; American Ambassador
to Robert Lovett, 11 Oct. 1948, 865.00/10/1148, RG 59, NA, all quoted in Filippelli,
American Labour, pp.150-51. Nevertheless, Gedda also appears to have had ACUE
associations, see, for example, The Union of Europe: Declarations of European
Statesmen, p.57, 9/1/10, Duncan Sandys Papers, CCC.
104. Rebattet reports that European Movement's international review, Europe Today and
Tommorrow, was 'almost completely financed by subscriptions form the Mutual
Security Agency and ACUE', 'European Unity', pp.201, 302.
105. Pomian (ed.), The Memoirs of Eminence Grise, p.237; retired American official in
correspondence with the author, 15 July 1993.
106. On propaganda see, 'Psychological Action to Counter Totalitarian Propaganda', in
record of a meeting between Acheson and de Gasperi, 24 Sept. 1951, FRUS, 1951,
IV pt.1, pp.685-6.
107. The figure of $10 million is given in Simpson, Blowback, p.92. The most
authoritative account of the elections by Miller, 'Taking off the Gloves', p.36, merely
refers to 'millions of dollars'. Colby, in his memoir Honorable Men, pp.108-40,
asserts that the 1948 elections constituted the largest OPC operation.
226 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT
108. On Chile and on overall spending under Truman, see Gregory F. Treverton, Covert
Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Post War World (New York, 1987), pp.14,
18, 41. On the funding of the American National Student Association, see Harry
Howe Ransom, 'Secret Intelligence in the United States, 1947-82: The CIA's Search
for Legitimacy', in Christopher M. Andrew and David N. Dilks (eds.), The Missing
Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century
(London, 1984), p.212.
109. Rebattet, 'European Movement', p.48.
110. Braden to Bedell Smith, 28 Dec. 1949, WBS, DDE.
111. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee, ACUE, 11 Oct. 1950, WBS,
DDE.
112. 'European Youth Campaign', CCS/P/2 1953, box 1, ACUE collection, HIWRP.
113. Rebattet, 'European Movement', pp.208-10.
114. Walter Lipgens, A History of European Integration, 1945-1947, Vol.1, The
Formation of the European Unity Movement (Oxford, 1982); Walter Lipgens and
Wilfried Loth (eds.), Documents on the History of European Integration, Vol. 3, The
Struggle for European Union by Political Parties and Pressure Groups in West
European Countries, 1945-50 (Berlin, 1988); Milward, The European Rescue of the
Nation State, pp.14-17.
115. Marion S. Miller, 'Approaches to European Institution Building of Carlo Sforza', in
Deighton (ed.), Building Postwar Europe, pp.55-70; minutes of the Board of
Directors, 6 June 1956, folder 91, ACUE records, LL.
116. Ernest Davies memorandum, 'The Labour Party and European Co-operation', 25
April 1950, fol.31, 9/9, Hugh Dalton Papers, BLPES; 'Supplementary Report on the
Second Session of the Consultative Assembly, Strasbourg', 18-24 Nov. 1950, p.20,
file: United Europe 1950, box: European Unity, Labour Party International
Department records, NMLH.
117. Romero, The United States and the European Trade Union Movement, pp.221-2;
Hogan, Marshall Plan, p.436.
118. Gillingam, Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, p.313. Spaak's attempt to associate
a European Political Community with the EDC proposals of the early 1950s
constitutes another example, ibid., p.349.
119. Charles F. Delzell, 'The European Federalist Movement in Italy: The First Phase,
1918-1947', The Journal of Modern History, Sept. 1960, pp.241-50; A. Bosco,
'Federal Union, Chatham House and the Anglo -- French Union', in A. Bosco (ed.), The
Federal Idea: The History of Enlightenment to 1945 (London, 1991), pp.237-62;
M.L. Smith and P.M.R. Stirk (eds.), Making the New Europe: European Unity in the
Second World War (London, 1990).
120. Bird, The Chairman, pp.471-2; Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral
Commission, (Cambridge, 1990), pp.125, 129, 151. Gill remarks upon 'the strong
connections' between Bilderberg and the European Movement, adding that two
prominent Bilderberg's were former principal private secretaries to Monnet, namely
François Duchene and Georges Berthoin. For an unsympathetic analysis of Bilderberg
see Eringer, The Global Manipulators.
121. Eringer, Global Manipulators, pp.22-54; Pomian, Eminence Grise, pp.250-59; Gill,
Trilateral Commission, pp. 151-5; Philip M. Williams, The Diary of Hugh Gaitskell,
1945-1956 (London: Cape, 1983) pp.542, 585. Former members of the British
clandestine services who had worked with the Americans were well represented at
Bilderberg in the 1950s and included Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, Christopher
Foster, Hugh Gaitskell, Sir Colin Gubbins and H. Montgomery Hyde.
122. Despite the recent commendable decision to release CIA material relating to some
post-war covert actions, this will not extend to ACUE material. In a response to a
OSS, CIA AND EUROPEAN UNITY 227
request by the author the CIA's Centre for the Study of Intelligence searched their
archives for further material and replied that they had 'nothing unclassified
available', David D. Gries, Director CSI, to author, 2 March 1994.
123. Questions about operations inside the United States were initially raised by Sol Stern,
'NSA and the CIA', Ramparts, V (1967), 29-38. See a!so Treverton, Covert Action,
pp.237-8; Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy (New Haven,
1989), pp.156-63; Loch K. Johnson, America's Secret Power: The CIA in a
Democratic Society (New York, 1989), pp.102-3. On the question of legality, see
Ranelagh, The Agency, pp.270-71.